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OVERVIEW
A. REGIONAL AND POLICY RATIONALE FOR THE HANDBOOK
The end of the Cold War has witnessed the eruption of numerous new armed conflicts in Africa, in
Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, northern Uganda, Liberia, Ivory
Coast, and Darfur, Sudan, thus adding to long-standing low-intensity wars such as that in southern Sudan.
Variously labeled complex humanitarian emergencies, civil wars, secessionist struggles, identity-based
conflicts, failed states, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, almost all the recent major conflicts have been
primarily intra-state in their initial issues, but regional factors have contributed to these conflicts and they
often spill across borders into neighboring countries.
While intra-state conflicts have arisen in all the regions of the world, they have been especially
devastating in Africa. In the period from 1994-2004, Africa’s conflicts resulted in millions of deaths,
ninety percent of which have been civilian, and they produced 3.1 million refugees and 10.6 million
internally displaced persons. Requiring huge expenditures for humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction, conflicts have undone decades of hard earned development by African governments,
USAID, and other donors. They have led to widespread human rights abuses, including increased genderbased violence; contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS; and resulted in recruitment or conscription of
thousands of child soldiers. They have also had serious but less recognized impacts far outside their
conflict zones, such as increased human trafficking, arms, and drug trafficking and fostering of terrorist
groups and activities. These consequences of conflict present immense challenges to African
development and the world for decades to come.1 Not surprisingly, conflicts have severely curtailed
USAID’s presence and activities in several strife-torn countries.
Because of the negative impacts of conflict on development, as well as their direct human toll, USAID
and all other major donors have adopted conflict prevention and management as an explicit priority and
cross-cutting objective, to be mainstreamed into their sectoral programming such as economic growth,
democracy and governance, and health and education. Formerly, donors approached conflicts largely by
avoiding the areas where conflict interfered with development activities or by providing humanitarian
assistance for its victims. Now, however, donors view conflict and its various sources as challenges in
themselves that need to be addressed through development programming. The whole range of
development programming is considered as another form of intervention, along with diplomacy, and
defense policies, that must be considered if existing conflicts are to be transformed and future conflicts
prevented. In short, USAID has chosen not only to work around or in conflict areas, but on conflict.
To operationalize its goals of conflict management and peacebuilding, USAID has undertaken a
considerable number of new activities over the past decade that are aimed at reducing the problem of
conflict. Spurred by the Rwanda genocide of 1994, the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, encompassing
ten countries in the Horn of Africa and east and central Africa, was the first major USAID effort to
explicitly apply a conflict perspective in its development programming. USAID bureaus have sponsored
a variety of conflict case studies, training workshops, conferences on conflict and development, and

1

Describing civil wars as “development in reverse,” a World Bank study lists the costs for the countries in conflict
as deaths, disease (HIV/AIDS among them), physical destruction, population displacement, high military
expenditures, capital outflows, political breakdown, psychological trauma, and landmines. The costs for other
nations include refugees, disease, increased military burdens, reduced economic growth, illicit drugs, and
international terrorism (World Bank 2003).
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conflict-oriented project evaluations. In recent years, USAID Missions have been asked to conduct
“conflict vulnerability assessments” (CVAs) or “conflict assessments ” (CAs)2. In Africa, CVAs are the
principal tools that USAID has used to date to analyze conditions of conflict and peace to assist Missions
and Regional Offices with strategic planning and programming. In 2002, the Office of Conflict
Mitigation and Management was created to strengthen the agency’s analytical and programming
capacities in conflict. USAID has released Conflict Policy Paper, Conflict Policy Implementation
Guidelines, as well as a Fragile States Strategy. USAID and other donors and multilateral organizations
are increasingly integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into development programming.
Related activities include:3
•
•
•
•

Funding explicit conflict management and peacebuilding programs and projects;
Training staff and partners in peace and conflict theory and practice, and in monitoring and
evaluation;
Evaluating the impacts of programs/projects for their impacts on conflict and peace; and
Collecting “lessons learned” and “best practices” and using them for program design and
implementation processes.

B. CONFLICT-SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING
USAID currently works in many countries that are affected by various stages and degrees of conflict
through its Democracy and Governance, Economic Growth, and other sectoral strategic objectives (SOs).
When viewed through a conflict lens, all this development programming can be designed and applied in
specific ways so that it does not worsen the various sources of conflicts and, instead, may contribute to
reversing conflict trends. While not all countries in Africa are experiencing conflict, programming
through a conflict lens is beneficial because it seeks to identify the potential and actual sources of tension
in a country or region so that programs can avoid aggravating these or creating new sources of tension.
Just as importantly, it seeks to identify the potential and actual peace capacities in a country or region so
that programs can avoid undermining as well as contribute to strengthening these capacities or build new
peace capacities. Strengthening peace capacities can include indigenous or international programs,
national or international policies or legislation, indigenous institutions or organizations, traditional
practices for preventing and resolving conflicts, or individual national or community leaders. In many
contexts, the single most effective means of contributing to sustainable peace is to build and strengthen
various indigenous peace capacities when and where they can be effective. Indeed, some of the most
innovative peacebuilding interventions in Africa build on the wealth of traditional conflict resolution
practices that exist throughout the continent.
Conflict sensitivity involves being aware in a particular context of the various causes of both peace and
conflict. It also involves being aware of the impact on interventions of the causes of both peace and
conflict, and designing or modifying interventions accordingly. In essence, conflict-sensitive
programming involves explicit consideration of the role of development, humanitarian assistance, and
peacebuilding programs and projects in contributing to conflict and promoting peace. Conflict-sensitive
programming applies to all phases of peace and conflict, from stable peace, to unstable peace or latent or
pre-conflict, to manifest or violent conflict, to post-conflict. This mainstreaming of conflict-sensitivity
also can occur at all phases of the program cycle, from assessment to monitoring and evaluation.

2

Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) is the term used for the model that has been developed by REDSO under
the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) initiative. It is based on over a decade of experience conducting analysis and
programming in African conflict contexts. An Agency-wide global Conflict Assessment Framework has been
developed by the Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM).
3
This list was generated by participants in the ANE workshop.
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Mainstreaming conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding means applying the conflict lens to a local area, an
entire country or regional strategy.
It is generally preferable to mainstream conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding programming into all country
programs and overall strategies and throughout the programming cycle, rather than to have separate
conflict mitigation or peacebuilding programs. Conflict should be mainstreamed into all levels of any
Results Framework as well, from the SOs to the indicators. Viewing development, transition, and
humanitarian assistance through a ‘conflict lens’ means recognizing that every decision and every
activity, whether at the macro level, through policies, or the micro level, through operational decisions,
has the potential, depending on how and when they are designed and implemented, to contribute to
conflict or to peace. For example, decisions and resources can create winners and losers. In Africa, a gain
or loss for an individual often means a gain or loss for an entire extended family, and sometimes for an
entire community or an ethnic group.

C. AIMS OF THE HANDBOOK
By 2004, over 30 CVAs had been conducted in sub-Saharan Africa. These included national, regional,
sub-national and cross-border CVAs. Generally, most CVAs are carried out by a team of national and
international experts working in-country in close collaboration with the Mission. Despite this experience
and because of it, there is still much to be learned from how CVAs have been conducted so far and the
strengths and weaknesses in current practices. Many Mission staff are not yet familiar with CVAs. Some
aspects of CVAs, especially the linkage from conflict analysis to program design and monitoring and
evaluation, have not received the focused attention that is required. CVAs have mainly undertaken the
initial assessment steps in the USAID programming cycle, but not dealt fully with conflict-sensitive
program design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.
The purpose of this Handbook is to present and explain the practical elements and steps involved not only
in CVAs but also the subsequent steps required to move from conflict-sensitive analysis to conflictsensitive action. By using Africa-specific examples gained from over a decade of conflict management
and peace building work, this Handbook is intended to provide programming guidance for meeting
USAID’s growing requirements for addressing conflicts more deliberately. The Handbook contributes
guidance from the Africa Bureau to supplement DCHA/CMM’s Conflict Assessment Framework and the
companion USAID Conflict Policy and Implementation Guidelines.
The Handbook is intended for the use of USAID program and sectoral officers based in bilateral and
regional Missions in Africa or in the Africa Bureau in Washington. Specifically, the Handbook is
designed primarily for the following readers:
•
•
•
•
•

Those who are responsible for designing, managing, and evaluating conflict and peacebuilding
programs, including Missions receiving funds from the Africa Bureau Conflict and Peacebuilding
Fund.
Those whose programs are likely to be significantly affected (positively or negatively) by conflict
situations or peacebuilding interventions.
Those who are tasked with formulating, managing, and participating in conflict vulnerability
assessments.
Those implementing partners, contractors, or grantees that are asked to act as consultants to
undertake s and to identify and incorporate CVA recommendations into USAID strategies and
performance monitoring plans (PMPs).
Those implementing partners, both African and international, who design, implement, monitor,
and evaluate conflict transformation and peace building activities.
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It is unlikely that any single individual will be responsible for all of the steps in the conflict programming
process – from design of a CVA to evaluating programs. It is important for all participants in the process
to know how their role is linked to other tasks. While users can read in detail only the section that pertains
to the immediate task for which they are responsible, it is highly recommended that readers familiarize
themselves with the entire process.
The Handbook builds on previous USAID initiatives in Africa and elsewhere that develop frameworks
and models for conflict analysis and peacebuilding programming and monitoring and evaluation through
case studies, lessons learned, and best practices. It incorporates references to previously published
analytical frameworks and models developed by operational units in USAID including: the Africa
Bureau, particularly AFR/SD, the Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and
Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), and DCHA’s Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM).
The Handbook has been written in generic terms so to be as compatible as possible with the emerging
analytical perspectives arising from the intersecting but broader fragile states perspective currently being
discussed by USAID, the Department of State, and others. Although all conflicts do not stem from failed
or failing states, nor do all failed or failing states stem from conflicts, there are many common sources of
both of these conditions. The steps outlined here for assessing and responding to potential, actual, or past
violent conflicts are basically the same as those for failing, failed, or recovering states, although specific
problems of concern may vary.
The guidebook is intended as a living document and a work in progress. As both external and internal
security, political, economic, and other changes affect Africa; as USAID’s strategies for addressing
conflict evolve; as more lessons are learned; better practices are identified; and as new USAID
frameworks, models, and programming procedures emerge; the Handbook can be updated to reflect and
incorporate these changes.

D. STRUCTURE OF THE HANDBOOK
This Handbook is divided into three sections that mirror the basic steps involved in any programming
cycle: problem analysis and assessment, program design and implementation, and monitoring and
evaluation. These steps apply to all sectors in USAID’s three pillars – DCHA, EGAT, and Health. In a
USAID Mission the ideal sequence in which to take steps in applying a conflict and peacebuilding
perspective would be:
1. The analysis of the causes of conflict and the causes of peace, (such as through a CVA);
2. The development of a conflict-sensitive Country Strategic Plan (CSP) and conflict-sensitive
programs;
3. Implementation of programs and activities; and
4. Ongoing monitoring for peace and conflict impacts, and evaluation including peace and conflict
impacts, which would immediately feed back into the next programming cycle.
These steps may not always occur in an exact prescribed order, however. The Handbook is designed so
that the user can pick it up and begin to use it wherever she or he is situated within the conflict
programming cycle and to continue through the cycle.
The typical CVA includes three components: conflict analysis (including vulnerabilities) and peace
analysis (including existing and potential peace capacities and sources of resiliency), some degree of
review of current and planned USAID programs in light of these analyses, and recommendations for new
activities or modifying existing activities so as to reduce the conflict causes and strengthen the peace
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capacities. There are, however, several variations on this basic pattern. Each of these substantive and
operational tasks and their common variations are described in more detail in Part I.
CVAs have typically undertaken the initial assessment steps in the USAID programming cycle, but do not
go into detail about the subsequent operational steps of program design, implementation, and monitoring
and evaluation. These steps involved in strategy development and program design and implementation are
covered in Part II, including how to link the findings and recommendations of the CVA to the strategic
planning process. The tasks in conflict and peacebuilding programming have normally involved
development of the Country Strategy, designing specific programs for each of the strategic objectives
(SOs) and intermediate results (IRs), and producing RFPs or RFAs. There may be a separate IR
specifically for conflict and peacebuilding, but it is more common that they will be a cross-cutting theme
to be mainstreamed into all development or humanitarian assistance programs as appropriate.
In many respects, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of peacebuilding programming and conflict-sensitive
programming are much like M&E for any development sector or cross-cutting theme, such as gender.
One difference is that the evaluative criteria used in assessing the impact of programs are derived from an
understanding of the sources of conflict and capacities for peace. Conflict-sensitive M&E, moreover,
requires not only assessing program performance, it also requires ongoing monitoring of the conflict itself
and assessing the impact of conflict and peace on the program. More research and experience is still
needed in designing and conducting M&E for peacebuilding programs. Nevertheless, new tools are being
developed by USAID, and these are presented in Section III.
This Handbook draws on the experience so far in an activity know as “peace and conflict impact
assessment (PCIA). To date, the formulation of conflict-sensitive program designs based on assessing
development programs’ impacts on conflict and peace has been pursued under this rubric. A PCIA is a
method for determining the effects of an intervention on peace and conflict, and the effects of peace and
conflict on the intervention. PCIAs marry the relatively new goals of conflict and peacebuilding with the
long-established methods of program evaluation, in order to apply conflict and peace impact criteria to
development, humanitarian assistance, and transition programs, as well as programs that are explicitly
conflict resolution or peacebuilding. Criteria having to do with program impacts on conflict and peace,
however, can be applied in the design of programs, as well as in their monitoring and evaluation. PCIAs
can be carried out before programs are implemented to determine their potential future impacts, much as
environmental impact assessments and gender impact assessments are utilized. PCIAs can also be carried
out during and after programs are implemented to gauge their impacts. Regardless of the phase in the
programming cycle at which a PCIA is applied, it is concerned with how and how much a program
decreases or eliminates the causes of the conflict or increases or builds capacities for peace. The
Handbook returns to PCIAs in Parts II and III.
Every African region and country is unique in its details; similarly, every USAID Mission and its partners
differs. In designing conflict-sensitive programs, there cannot be a “one-size-fits-all” approach to conflict
programming. For this reason, the Handbook seeks to provide a menu of options for a variety of contexts
and contingencies for carrying out each step of the process from analysis to action. In Appendix III,
websites are provided to facilitate access to resources, models, and tools that can be used at each of the
stages required to carry out the conflict programming process. These resources include sample Scopes of
Work for each phase, frameworks for conflict analysis, sample RFAs and RFPs, and illustrative Africacontextualized indicators based upon USAID’s conflict indicators for monitoring and evaluation.
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E. SCOPE AND PARTICIPANTS IN CONFLICT-SENSITIVE
PROGRAMMING
Two themes related to the conflict programming process recur throughout this Handbook as a result of
major concerns expressed by USAID field officers and their partners during a planning workshop for this
document held in South Africa in 2003. One concern has to do with the importance of multisectoral
programming. Multisectoral programming recognizes that just as there are multiple causes of conflict, the
paths to conflict mitigation and peace must be flexible and interdisciplinary. Therefore, the integrated
contributions of the various USAID sectors are critical. This Handbook will discuss how to involve SO
teams in the conflict-sensitive programming process, how different sectors can exacerbate conflict or
contribute to peace through their programming, and how to design conflict-sensitive monitoring and
evaluation tools for different sectors.
The other underlying theme concerns collaboration with multiple stakeholders. USAID cannot be all
things to all countries, and sustainable peace, like sustainable development, occurs when a strategy-based
synergy exists between many relevant actors. Different partners, including other USG agencies, bi-lateral
or multi-lateral donors, host governments, international and African NGOs, and the private sector, each
may have something to contribute to peacebuilding. Numerous USAID evaluations and other studies
conclude that effective conflict prevention, mitigation, and peacebuilding require the skills and resources
of many actors who collaborate to the maximum extent possible. At the same time, each faces constraints
and challenges. This Handbook discusses how to carry out programming that builds on the comparative
strengths and resources of each stakeholder, including those of USAID, in order to design integrated,
holistic interventions that promote sustainable peace and development.
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PART I: ANALYZING CONFLICT AND
CAPACITIES FOR PEACE
The first step undertaken by USAID in the strategy development process and the planning and reporting
cycle generally involves conducting assessments of the current conflict situation in the country or region
for which interventions and activities are planned. Assessments in all sectors are conducted, as effective
programming includes a clear understanding of the problems being faced, the identification of appropriate
results, development of approaches to reach those results, determining the levels of resources,
development of an organizational framework to achieve results, and defining the means to measure
progress. In these ways, conflict analysis is similar to other cross-sectoral analyses such as gender or
environment. Robust, multisectoral conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding programming must proceed from
a thorough analysis of conflict as well as of the existing and potential capacities for peace. This analysis is
called a conflict assessment (CA) by USAID/CMM, and a conflict vulnerability assessment (CVA) by the
Africa Bureau. In this document, the term CVA will be employed.
As of the April 2004 release of the USAID Automated Directives System (ADS) on CD-Rom, the
Conflict Prevention Guidance for Strategic Planning states that “as part of preparing a new USAID
country strategy, operating units are asked to: (1) prepare an appropriate vulnerability analysis that
addresses the potential for conflict, (2) summarize the findings of such analyses in the strategy document,
and (3) specifically indicate when and how these findings affect the proposed strategy.” Furthermore,
“The objective of this strengthened vulnerability analysis is to: help safeguard the achievement of USAID
strategic objectives and development investments; and make the need for costly post-conflict
humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and reconstruction less likely.” As mentioned in the introduction,
subsequent USAID policy papers emphasize the protection of USAID’s existing strategic objectives
against the threat of conflict, as well as using USAID programs in a deliberate way to try to prevent or
mitigate such conflicts.
The Mission carries out this analysis of conflict and of the existing and potential capacities for peace as
part of the Mission’s series of assessments, prior to the articulation of its programming vision and a
concept paper. Once the concept paper is submitted, and the operating unit has received planning
parameters, more formal sector-specific technical analyses may be conducted followed by the making of
strategic choices. At that point, the CVA becomes critical. A quality CVA is useful as a planning tool to
both generalists (such as the PDO and the GDO) and to specialists (such as the SO team members) in the
design of the strategic plan, including, as necessary, the use of scenario-based planning.

A. THE ELEMENTS AND ROLES OF CONFLICT VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENTS
Conflict vulnerability assessments are composed of three distinct elements or components. There may be
additional elements as well, but these three are always included.
The first component is the analysis of the causes or sources of the conflict(s) and the causes or sources of
peace, or peace capacities, in a country or region. The analysts generally employ an existing analytical
framework or may adapt one or a combination of existing frameworks to suit the specific context.
Considerable overlap exists, however, in the factors that are listed in the several conflict analysis
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frameworks developed by USAID, other donors, research institutions, and practice organizations in recent
years.4
The second component of a CVA is the review of the Mission’s existing and planned programs to
determine what impact they have in both contributing to peacebuilding and conflict reduction, or
generating new or aggravating existing conflicts. In the case of a regional CVA, this would involve a
review of the programs of all the Missions in that region.
The third component of a CVA contains the recommendations for the Mission’s strategy, programs, and
activities. These recommendations are primarily designed for the Mission, but they may also include
recommendations for other USG agencies and departments, for the host country government, for
implementing partners, and for coordination with other donors. These components are visualized in Table
I-A, which presents a blank “worksheet” in developing the analytical content for a CVA report.
Table I-A.
Common Components of CVAs

I.

Causes of Conflict

Capacities for
Peace

II.
III.
Existing
USAID and
Implementing Recommendations Recommendations
Partners’
for Modifications in
for Adding New
Existing Programs
Programs
Programs

VARIETIES OF CVAS
Beyond these essential elements, CVAs vary with respect to geographical coverage, depth, and
methodology. USAID has conducted over 30 CVAs in sub-Saharan Africa.
National CVAs, which focus on conflict(s) in a single country, are by far the most common type. USAID
has also undertaken regional CVAs in southern Africa and the Great Lakes Region. Regional CVAs focus
on the conflicts within and between the countries in a particular region, the common causes of conflicts,
the common causes of peace, and recommended regional, national, and local interventions.5
A number of CVAs have also been sub-national and cross-border in scope. For example, one CVA
analyzed the conflicts in the Karamojong region, which encompasses portions of Sudan, Kenya, and
Uganda. A national CVA for Ethiopia included a sub-regional cross-border component that analyzed the

4

An excellent and comprehensive comparison of existing frameworks is to be found in Conflict-sensitive
Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact
Assessment: Resource Pack. pp. 12-40.
5
USAID’s Regional CVAs are generally conducted for USAID’s Regional Offices. There are three Regional
Offices in Africa.
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conflicts in the pastoralist regions and border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Somaliland. This
CVA included national level, supra-regional level (Ethiopia’s relations with its neighbors), sub-national
level (focusing on one specific region of the country), and cross-border components.
The depth of CVAs also can vary widely, depending on the character of the problems addressed, the
resources and time available to USAID, and the timing in relation to the Mission or Regional Office’s
strategy development or programming cycle. In some cases the CVA will consist simply of a desk study.
For example, the regional CVA for southern Africa consisted of a desk study alone. It was carried out by
two researchers with considerable regional expertise who did not travel to Africa for the purpose of the
CVA. Rather, they relied on an extensive review of the literature, previous studies, and policy documents
from international, regional, and national organizations, and they drew upon their previous knowledge of
the region and the field of conflict analysis and peacebuilding. At the opposite extreme, the Ethiopia CVA
involved a team of approximately a dozen researchers from the US, other African countries, European
countries, and Ethiopia. The team spent approximately six weeks in Ethiopia and traveled throughout the
country and to almost all of its neighboring countries.
Clearly, the scope and depth of a given CVA will determine the team composition. Consequently, teams
can be comprised of international and/or local external experts only, Mission personnel only, or a
combination, and can have as many as 12 members or as few as one. Teams can spend as much as six
weeks carrying out fieldwork or they can conduct a desk study and a literature review only and carry out
no fieldwork whatsoever. Typically, however, teams are comprised of two to four people, who spend two
to four weeks doing fieldwork, and conduct an initial literature review (desk study) in addition to the field
research.
The methodology employed may also vary considerably. For example, some CVAs may involve
developing alternative scenarios for the short- to medium-term situations in the country and then suggest
strategies and contingency plans for addressing each scenario. CVAs are not, however, intended to be
predictive studies or to provide precise forecasts of the future. Other CVAs may assume that there will be
little change in the current situation, and thus describe alternative strategies for addressing that situation.
Still others may involve not only general recommendations, but may require that the CVA team design
the results framework.
TIMING THE CVA
The outset of the strategic planning process is certainly the most opportune time to conduct an
assessment. Assessments are also useful and sometimes necessary at other key times for USAID
Mission.7 CVA timing may also respond to changing circumstances in country situations. However,
CVAs can be and are conducted during all phases in the strategic planning process. The program review
and recommendations components are the most affected by the phase in the planning process in which the
CVA is conducted.
A crucial issue of timing pertains to when a CVA is being conducted in relation to the phase of conflict
that a country or countries within a region is experiencing. One of the goals of the CVA is to establish
more clearly what level and phase of conflict different parts of a country or region are in at a given
moment, for these different stages tend to require differing programming components or emphases. Some
CVAs are conducted in countries that are in the throes of violent civil wars or wars with neighbors.
Others are conducted in countries that are in the post-conflict period and are recovering from violent
conflict. Still others may not have experienced violent conflict in the recent past, and are not experiencing
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it in the present, but may be in a potential conflict phase and thus are experiencing an unstable peace,6 in
which rising tensions and other indicators of impending violent conflict abound.
Some countries in Africa are or appear to be enjoying a condition of stable and sustainable peace with no
conflict in the recent past nor any serious prospect of violence. In such cases it may still be valuable to
undertake a CVA to find why peace reigns in the country, how it has been established, and how it is being
sustained. Lessons can be learned from countries at peace that are as valuable as those learned from
countries in conflict. After identifying the capacities that contribute to that peace, interventions also can
be designed and implemented to strengthen these capacities and to ensure that programs do not undermine
them.

B. PREPARING FOR THE CVA
PREPARING THE SCOPE OF
WORK (SOW)

INFORMATION THAT MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE
CVA SOW:

• What is the purpose of the CVA?
• Where is the Mission in the strategic planning or programming

It is the responsibility of the Mission to
cycle?
prepare the preliminary Scope of Work
• What questions must the Mission have answered in order to
(SOW) for the CVA. Once the team
proceed with the strategic planning or programming cycle?
and/or contractor have been identified, it
• What is the scope of the CVA? Desk study only? Desk study
may be revisited and refined in order to
and field research?
bring additional expertise to the task.
• What expertise is required for the CVA? How many people are
needed for the CVA?
Sometimes the fine-tuning and clarifying
of the SOW can be accomplished via
• How much time is needed/available for the CVA?
telephone and e-mail even before the team • What sites will the team visit? What are the criteria for site
selection?
has arrived in the country, such as during
• Whom will the team meet? What categories of individuals,
the off-site Team Planning Meeting
groups, and organizations do they need to meet?
(TPM), in collaboration with the Mission
•
How much money is needed/available for the CVA?
by telephone and e-mail. Often, final
agreement will be achieved after the team
has arrived in-country during initial meetings with the USAID officer(s) overseeing the CVA and during
the in-country TPM. Once the Mission and the team are in agreement about the final SOW, it should be
distributed to all team members and relevant Mission staff.
Given the sensitivity of the topics that CVAs address, it is a good idea for the Mission staff to meet with
the US Ambassador and other relevant US Embassy personnel during the preparation of the SOW. In
some countries, there may be significant resistance on the part of other USG departments to the idea of
USAID engaging in carrying out the CVA or carrying out conflict and peacebuilding activities.
Sometimes, this may reflect in part the USG’s relationship with the host government. In such instances,
the scope of the CVA may have to be negotiated between USAID and the relevant departments or to the
satisfaction of the Ambassador. It is also critical to secure permission for the team to travel to various
parts of the country – or other countries in the case of a regional CVA – before the team arrives incountry.
It is also prudent for the Mission staff to meet with the relevant host government bodies during the
preparation of the SOW. These meetings require considerable forethought and diplomacy. It is essential to
inform the host government what the assessment team is doing, why it is being done, and how USAID
plans to use the information obtained. Most governments are supportive of work that promotes
6

Conflict analysts use a number of terms to define different phases or stages of conflicts. These include positive
peace, negative peace, stable, peace, unstable peace. See the Glossary for definitions.
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peacebuilding within their respective countries and between them and their neighbors, but the nature of
CVAs may also arouse suspicions. These suspicions must be acknowledged and addressed either directly
or indirectly, depending on the context.8
A critical question that must be answered when preparing the SOW involves the degree of participation of
other stakeholders in the analysis and programming processes. Participatory processes generally take
more time and cost more money in the short term, but save time and money in the long term. It is
important to keep in mind that participatory research and programming continue to be among the best
practices in the field of peacebuilding (as well as in the fields of development and humanitarian
assistance), and every effort should be expended to ensure that these processes be as participatory as
possible given constraints of time and other resources.

NAMIBIA: BROAD STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT(MS. MONICA KOEP)
USAID/Namibia is producing its second CVA for the new CSP for FY 04-10. By making the CVA development a
more integral part of the process of developing the CSP, the Mission intends to build the CVAs’ recommendations
into the evolving strategy. This goal led the Mission to broaden the approach of the CVA to emphasize the multisectoral nature of conflict rather than have a narrowly DG-focused CVA. The Mission structured the CSP process
by orienting discussions toward five scenarios for southern Africa drawn from prevailing academic research.1
The Namibia CVA development process was geared toward ensuring broad legitimacy and acceptance of the
findings and recommendations by promoting a widely-owned process that involved various stakeholders. This
consultative process was also an early investment in building up the kind of stakeholder involvement that would be
critical during the implementation stages. These stakeholders, identified in different sectors, were organized into
roundtable meetings in key sectors. Individuals were drawn from groups with whom the Mission was already
dealing and those that would likely become involved in conflict management issues. Specifically, these roundtable
meetings involved consultants, local government, civil society and USAID staff – all of whom would participate in
the CVA process. No Embassy personnel were included, however. These round-tables are now expected to be an
on-going process for different types of activities associated with the implementation phase of the country strategy.
In writing the SOW to support the CVA, the Mission included themes from a ‘scenario workshop’ in which one day
was devoted to discussion of each of the sectors and issues (e.g. Environmental issues/ HIV/AIDS) and another
day to consolidating the issues into a cohesive set of priorities for research in the CVA. The scenario workshop
findings defined the priority areas for the CVA based on comprehensive local knowledge developed from among
the convened partners while a consultant helped meld USAID/AFR priorities and processes with local knowledge of
USAID Mission staff and local consultants.
According to the Namibia Mission representative, elaborate as their process was it still raised a number of issues
that need further discussion and for which guidance would be useful. For example, CVAs (and most other conflict
analyses) do not examine the sources of resilience and the state or societal capacity to contain conflict; few
analytical resources or programming resources are devoted to deepening such capacities. The experience also
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PUTTING THE TEAM TOGETHER
There are specific types of expertise that are required in order to successfully carry out the research and
writing of a CVA. In broad terms, these are:
•
•
•

Knowledge of the concepts and problems entailed in conflict and peacebuilding;
Knowledge of the country and the region, particularly its social, political and economic
conditions;
Knowledge of USAID programs, the strategic planning process, and the programming cycle.

In addition, team members must have interviewing skills, the ability to organize, analyze, and synthesize
large amounts of qualitative and quantitative data; cross-cultural and interpersonal skills; and writing
skills. Team members must also be acceptable to the USG and to the host country government. It is rare
to find all this expertise in a single individual, so teams are generally comprised of several members, one
of whom is the designated team leader. The conflict specialist on the team often plays that role, given the
central goal of applying a conflict lens to the society and existing policies and programs.
It is recommended that the team be composed of both international and local experts. At least one person
on the team should be a professional from the host country. In highly divided societies, it is desirable that
local team members represent the major identity groups (ethnic, religious, and regional groups), which
may require having more than one local expert. This can be complicated however, and requires that the
individual(s) responsible for identifying team members have a thorough understanding of the society.
In Nigeria, for example, parties to conflict represent different tribes, different regions, different religions,
and different political parties. It might seem obvious that a team for a hypothetical CVA in Nigeria should
include at least one Nigerian Christian and one Nigerian Muslim. However, the situation is complicated
by the fact that some people’s religion and ethnicity may overlap with their regional origin in some cases
but not overlap in other cases. There are both Christian and Muslim members of the Yoruba ethnic group
in southern Nigeria. Therefore, if the Christian and the Muslim selected to be on the team were both
Yoruba, the team would likely still be perceived to be biased - in favor of the Yoruba and the south.
Furthermore, specific individuals may be members of one group, but associated with or aligned with
another group, for any number of reasons, such as marriage, business relationships, or political alliances.
It is therefore essential to look beyond group membership and consider how specific individuals are
perceived in their communities. Similar considerations should go into choosing interpreters.
Finally, the team may also have a member, generally a host country national, who will assist the team
with logistics. This role may include setting up interviews, arranging transportation and accommodation,
hiring translators and drivers, overseeing printing, photocopying, and similar tasks. Some care must also
be taken in identifying this individual, since he/she will have access to the team’s findings and written
products, and will be privy to intra-team discussions and to some interviews.
Team identity is important because it influences investigator biases, and because it determines the
perceptions that key informants and host governments have about the team. Investigator bias will have an
impact on what data is collected and on how it is analyzed. Perceptions held about the team also have a
significant impact on the quality of the data collected – particularly through interviews - since these
perceptions will determine the level of trust that key informants and the host government have toward the
team. In addition, the identity of team members may determine whether the team has access to specific
regions or groups or individuals. For some of the same reasons, it is desirable that teams be gender

ANALYSIS TO ACTION: A GUIDEBOOK FOR CONFLICT-SENSITIVE USAID PROGRAMMING IN AFRICA 13

balanced. Ultimately, the perception held about the CVA team could have a crucial impact not only on the
quality of the CVA but also on the perception of USAID programs in the country.
Among the most important participants in a CVA are the Mission or Regional Office personnel because
they have the most knowledge about the Mission or Regional Office strategy and programs. More
importantly, they are the people who will actually design and implement the activities stemming from the
analysis and recommendations. It is highly recommended that Missions identify at least one staff person
to participate in designing and conducting the research for the CVA.
It is also desirable that the Mission staff person overseeing the CVA and the CVA team members identify
from the outset a ‘champion’ for carrying out the research and implementing the recommendations of the
CVA report. Ideally, this person will be a senior staff member within USAID or at the Embassy – the
more senior the better. The individual should be someone who can and will shepherd the CVA research
and recommendations through the USG and the host country government.
FACILITATING REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND DOCUMENTS
An initial review of relevant literature is generally conducted before the team’s arrival in-country.
However, the team will continue to collect documents throughout the assessment, particularly documents
from institutions and organizations whose personnel are interviewed as part of the assessment. In general,
this initial review is not a full-fledged literature review; but, in the event that the CVA is only a desk
study and no field research is conducted, it should involve a full-fledged review and distillation of all
authoritative literature that is relevant to the aims of the CVA.
In either case, this review should consist of mostly primary literature.9 However, some people prefer to
read secondary literature as well. 10 Others believe that this skews the CVA research, and prefer to read
the secondary literature only after conducting the field research. It is recommended that a USAID staff
member at post and in Washington participate in, or evaluate the desk review, and specifically examine
pertinent classified documents that might not be available to consultants not holding security clearances.
There are a number of documents that are always an important part of this review. Among these
documents are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The Country Strategic Plan (CSP);
Previous Mission assessments, including DG, EG, environment, gender, etc.;
Relevant Mission program documents, including those for peacebuilding programs;
Relevant assessments conducted by other donors and implementing partners;
Relevant program documents from other donors and implementing partners;
Relevant host country government documents, such as PRSPs and relevant policy and program
documents;
Relevant quantitative data, particularly that relate to violence, armed conflict, humanitarian
needs, and human migration;
Relevant economic and political data (e.g. percentages of sources of foreign exchange from
various sectors, percentages of votes for various parties/candidates by location);
Third-party reports, such as those by human rights organizations;
Published or unpublished secondary documents, such as conflict analyses from academic
journals.

It is the responsibility of the Mission to provide the team with documents that pertain to the Mission
itself. It is also recommended that the Mission obtain and provide the team with documents from other
donors and implementing partners. Generally, it will be provided in the form of either the websites where
the documents can be downloaded or in the form of electronic versions of the documents. Where only
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hard copies exist, the Mission should provide them when the team arrives in-country or should mail them
if there is sufficient time.
If possible, these documents should be obtained and read by the team before the initial Team Planning
Meeting (TPM). The knowledge gained can guide the team in making preliminary decisions about
methodology: the analytical framework; the questions to be answered; the programs to be reviewed; the
key informant categories, individuals, groups, and organizations to be interviewed; and the sites to be
visited. A team that arrives at the initial TPM – and even more importantly, arrives in-country – having
already reviewed the documents will be able to utilize their time much more strategically. A useful
general rule for CVAs is: the more knowledge of the subject that is gained early on, the more effective the
CVA will be.
THE INITIAL TEAM PLANNING MEETING (TPM)
Generally, the initial team planning meeting takes place in Washington, DC, so as to enable the team to
meet with key individuals in relevant bureaus and centers in USAID/Washington – such as Africa Bureau,
CMM, OTI, OFDA, FFP, PVC, DG; key individuals from the State Department, including the Country
Desk Officer(s), and technical bureaus as relevant – INR (information and research), PRM (refugees),
DRL (democracy, human rights, labor), INL (narcotics). Ideally, the team should meet with key contacts
at academic and research institutions or other individuals with in-depth knowledge about the country and
its political and economic circumstances and intra-regional relationships. This often means that only the
international team members participate in the initial TPM. Sometimes – and this is highly recommended –
the person responsible for overseeing the CVA within USAID will also participate in the initial TPM.
There are a number of topics that must be addressed during the initial TPM. These include:
Products
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reviewing and suggesting refinements to the SOW;
Selecting or developing an analytical framework;
Refining the research (CVA) questions;
Identifying the various remaining sources of information that need to be examined;
Determining specific key informants and categories of key informants;
Drafting a preliminary outline of the report; and
Discussing sites to be visited.

Processes
•
•
•
•

Arranging for logistics and administrative tasks;
Agreeing on individual team members’ roles and responsibilities;
Sharing personal and work habits and preferences; and
Teleconferencing with the Mission.

C. FORMULATING THE CVA METHODOLOGY
ADOPTING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DATA COLLECTION
The team leader needs to guide the group through a collaborative and iterative research design process,
beginning with the design of the analytical framework. In order to analyze the causes of existing and
potentially violent conflict within a given country or region, as well as to identify the capacities and
potential for building and sustaining peace, the team needs to be guided by a list of key questions that all
become familiar with. Such a list of key questions helps to focus the team members on the various factors
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that are most likely to be driving conflict at different causal levels and to avoid being distracted by the
multitude of extraneous or trivial factors. Consequently, some framework is essential for determining
what questions the team should ask and what data the team should seek.11
To assess the status of conflict and peace, the team will generally need to rely on an existing analytical
framework or may adapt one or more existing frameworks to the specific context. It is rarely feasible for a
team to have time to develop a new framework for a specific context.12 Because of the size of the
research literature on causes of conflict, a few scholars have surveyed as much of it as possible in order to
develop summary lists of the main causes that appear to be common to many of the empirical studies.
One of the best such frameworks is the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework developed by the Office
of Conflict Mitigation and Management. It is recommended that several of these rigorous, research-based
frameworks be provided to all team members prior to the initial TPM. Team members can then review
them ahead of time and be prepared for discussion of the particular framework to be employed for the
CVA at the TPM.
This initial discussion is crucial in order to ensure that the team members share a mutual understanding of
the substantive scope and tasks entailed in the field research and have a menu of options from which to
pick and choose as they refine the framework for the particular context. Of course, this analytical
framework should not be applied rigidly or exclusively. Every CVA team should also remain open to
particular contextual factors that may not appear in existing frameworks. Although the team members
should continue to adapt and refine the framework as they become more immersed in the field research,
establishing this common frame of reference should be a high priority at the outset in order to avoid
serious confusion about the focus of the data collection, the data analysis, and the written report.
CASE STUDY: DESIGNING THE ASSESSMENT FOR NIGERIADEVISING AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR NIGERIA
During an evaluation conducted for OTI in Nigeria that included a CVA as a component of the research, the team leader
used a participatory approach to built consensus at every step of the data collection, data analysis, and drawing up
recommendations processes, beginning with the framework and methodology designs.
The team came to the initial TPM having conducted a preliminary review of both the existing conflict assessment models
and the literature relating to the causes of conflict in Nigeria. (Nigeria is a country for which there is a voluminous
amount of literature pertaining to the causes of conflict. For other countries there may be a severe scarcity of literature.)
Based on that review and interviews with Nigeria experts in Washington, DC, the team spent several hours
experimenting with potential frameworks for the purpose of organizing the data collection relating to sources of conflict.
During the team’s first meeting with the mission, the tentative framework was presented. Viewing the framework enabled
the mission to tell which elements among the sources of conflict on which it wanted the team to focus – and on which
ones it did not want the team to focus.1 The mission was also able to offer suggestions for designing the framework so
that it could be linked to the program review and, ultimately, the recommendations, in ways that were meaningful and
useful for the mission.
As the process of data collection and analysis progressed, and as the recommendations began to emerge from the data
analysis, the team met internally and with the mission several times to review and revise the framework, to present the
findings to date, and to initially delineate and flesh out the recommendations. This process involved constantly revisiting
the framework to ensure that it continued to be based on empirical evidence and that it continued to serve its purpose of
guiding the data collection and analysis, and of linking findings and recommendations. The process was concluded only
ith th
b i i
f th fi l
t

It is important to remember that the framework developed at the initial TPM is still only a preliminary
draft. It should be reviewed and revised in collaboration with the Mission and any team members who
were not at the initial TPM, such as Mission personnel or local consultants, during the in-country TPM. In
some CVAs, the in-country TPM is the initial TPM. The advantages and disadvantages to this are
primarily related to expense, and that is largely dependent on where the team members reside.
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DECIDING ON DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION METHODS
Decisions about data collection will depend on a number of factors. These include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Time available;
Funds available;
Security conditions;
Political sensitivities;
Team members’ collective skills;
Team member and Mission’s preferences.

CVA teams typically obtain data from the following types of investigative methods during the field
research:
•
•
•
•

Individual interviews with key informants;
Representatives of specific categories of stakeholders;
Focus groups comprised of specified categories of stakeholders;
Participant observation – especially of USAID-supported activities, such as peacebuilding
training sessions, dialogues, conferences, and similar activities.

It is the responsibility of the Mission to provide a preliminary list of key informants that can be reviewed
by the team during the initial TPM. To save time, the Mission can arrange appointments with at least
some of the individuals on the list for the first few days of the field research. The latter include
individuals for whom protocol requires that the team meet, and individuals whose buy-in is essential for
the success of the research and for program implementation. These could include key Embassy personnel,
key host government personnel, individuals who could provide the team with access to other key contacts,
and individuals with exceptional knowledge of the context.
However, it is the responsibility of the team to expand upon this list vertically (i.e., adding different
levels) and horizontally (i.e., identifying different groups of stakeholders) as the research gets underway.
Based on the framework, the team should finalize the types or categories and numbers of individuals,
groups, and organizations that should be interviewed during the field research. While the context
determines the relevant key contacts and categories of individuals, groups, and organizations, some key
individuals and categories are almost always interviewed when conducting a CVA. While not an
exhaustive list, some of these are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mission Director or Deputy Mission Director (or Regional Mission Director or Deputy Regional
Mission Director);
SO team leaders;
Ambassador;
DCM;
Political Officer;
Economic Officer;
Military Attaché;
Security Officer;
Highest individual accessible in relevant ministries of host country governments;
Other donors;
Implementing partners;
Civil society organizations (including women’s organizations); 13
Research and academic institutions;
Community leaders – official and traditional;
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•
•

Religious leaders; and
Media representatives.

As with the framework, the decisions made about these choices should be reviewed and revised in
collaboration with the Mission and any team members who were not at the initial TPM – such as Mission
personnel or local consultants – during the in-country TPM. It is important, however, that the team
members ultimately decide whom to interview or not to interview. They should be encouraged to reach
beyond the usual individuals and groups with whom the Mission normally communicates – and with
whom the Mission may not be able to communicate. The exception is when the Mission perceives that the
team’s meeting with a particular individual would seriously compromise the safety and security of the
team members.

D. CONDUCTING THE FIELD WORK
THE IN-COUNTRY PLANNING MEETING
As soon as the CVA team arrives in the country or countries to be studied, the most important task in
conducting the fieldwork is the establishment of a working relationship between the Mission and the
team. Communication between the Mission and the team is essential at initial and later points during the
CVA process, although it should ideally be continuous. The Mission must be committed to allocating
time for meeting with the team. Time spent now will be time saved later. In order for the team to collect
data that is useful to the Mission, to conduct a meaningful program review, and to make recommendations
that the Mission is willing and able to implement, the team must have information and knowledge that
only the Mission is able to provide.
Among the issues and tasks these discussions should cover are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Logistical arrangements
Further clarification of the SOW
Program information from SO teams
Revisiting the analytical framework and research (CVA) questions
Finalizing the data collection methods and the sites to be visited
Identifying the specific individuals to be interviewed under each of the various categories of
stakeholders decided earlier
Finalizing the report outline
Establishing procedures for working with the SO teams
Debriefing(s) schedule (mid-term, final)

COLLECTING THE DATA
The primary data collection activity of a CVA is almost always conducting interviews. These may be
individual interviews or group interviews. Once the initial list of key informants has been identified, the
next and most important step is developing the interview protocol. By this time the team will have a
general idea of what information is needed or what questions need to be answered, and will be ready to
articulate and formulate interview questions. They will also be able to make decisions about which key
informants can provide answers to which questions and which topics can be broached with which key
informants.
The next decision is to determine how team members are going to introduce themselves, the purpose of
the research, and the purpose of the interview. It is essential that the Mission and the team make this
decision collaboratively, because how the research is described and perceived by the host country
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government and other stakeholders can have a profound impact on the Mission’s relationships and its
ability to carry out its work. In many contexts, for example, describing the purpose as looking for
vulnerability to “conflict” may disturb officials and others, whereas describing the focus as “obstacles to
development” may be more suitable.
Some key informants will require formal letters of introduction. The Mission will be best placed to know
who will require formal letters of introduction, and will prepare the letters and provide them to the
appropriate team members. For some interviews, primarily the US Ambassador and senior level host
country government officials, it will be necessary for representatives of the Mission to accompany team
members to the interviews to make the introductions personally.
Other decisions that will have to made involve the structure, the substance, and the logistics of the
interviews, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Will the interviews employ closed-ended or open-ended questions or both?
How much time should be allotted for specific interviews?
What is the best location for specific interviews?
What is the best time of day or week for specific interviews?
Which team members should participate in which interviews?
How many team members should participate in each interview?
How will team members share responsibility for asking the questions or guiding the discussion in
each interview?
How will team members share responsibility for recording the findings of each interview?
How will team members share or report the findings of each interview to the entire team?

FIELDWORK CAVEATS
The process of conducting research for a CVA sometimes presents dilemmas that do not necessary arise
in a conventional sectoral assessment and in more stable countries. The reason is that the causes and
consequences of conflict may include corruption; organized crime; armed opposition groups; human
rights violations perpetrated by governments and other groups; illegal arms, drugs, or human trafficking;
and a host of other illegitimate or illegal actions and activities and other sensitivities. CVAs are
sometimes carried out in countries experiencing violent conflict in one or more regions. These may
represent barriers or even threats to the investigative process.
The team should always consult with the Mission about where it is safe and where it is unsafe to travel.
Talking to the Security Officer can sometimes serve not only to alert the team to risky areas but also
inform them further about the conflict environment. Sometimes, the team may be unable to obtain
permission from the Embassy or the host country government to travel to specific areas. As frustrating as
this may be, the team should always comply with such restrictions.
In addition to refraining from traveling to dangerous or restricted areas, the team should be judicious
about putting itself in danger by appearing to be too interested in or to know too much about illegitimate
or illegal actions and activities. One of the greatest challenges for the CVA team involves the collection
and management of sensitive information. The team must constantly ask itself whether it is crucial to
obtain specific information if the pursuit of such information will unnecessarily raise suspicions about the
purpose of the CVA, will jeopardize USAID’s relationship with the government, or will place the team or
its contacts in danger. A balance must also be struck between the need to gather meaningful information,
and the need to obtain and maintain the participation and buy-in of the government and other
stakeholders.
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Other ethical dilemmas may also present themselves during the course of a CVA. Occasionally a key
informant will provide sensitive information that only they could possess. A judgment will have to be
when writing the report whether to include that individual’s name in the list of contacts or whether or not
to include the information in the report.
Researchers sometimes get caught up in the excitement of uncovering controversial information. It is
important to remember that a CVA is not an inquisition, and the interview is not an interrogation.
Sometimes key informants ‘lobby’ the researchers either to gain a mouthpiece for their view of the
conflict or situation in their country or to gain access to USAID funds for their organization. Maintaining
a balanced perspective is an ongoing challenge when conducting research in highly charged situations.
The interview is also an opportunity. The act of posing questions itself begins the process of social
change. The interview can begin the process of obtaining buy-in from stakeholders. Therefore articulating
questions and adopting an interview style that are elicitive rather than prescriptive, and collaborative
rather than adversarial, can be a catalyst for constructive responses to conflict and positive approaches to
peacebuilding.
SOUTH AFRICA: ON THE SPOT ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYFOCUSING A CVA
ON CURRENT PRIORITIES
The South Africa Mission conducted a CVA in FY01-02 at a time when Mission management was very sensitive to conflict
issues and did not rate the Republic of South Africa (RSA) as “most vulnerable.” Given the strategy review, the South
Africa CVA focused on how to assist government at the local level and how to address crime, which had emerged as the
most immediate threat to economic and social life. The CVA activities and follow-up strategy focused on working with civil
society, which was dealing with managing local conflicts on a daily basis. Rather than established political parties or
governmental institutions, it was the community groups and especially churches that took a leading role in managing
conflict that arose in communities. However, the larger “national” transition-from-apartheid related conflicts (such as those
that emerged from evidence presented at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission) remained unaddressed especially as
victims sought compensation or follow up action from government. Moreover, the role of the private sector has been
critical crucial to but limited in the conflict management process in South Africa. The CVA team therefore sought to
promote the private sector’s role in addressing possible triggers or interventions to prevent conflict.
The question of access to resources, especially given the enduring inequality of levels and quality of services delivered by
the local governments, was one issue that USAID South Africa considered a threat to peaceful relations. Although the
level and quality of service delivery to the townships was previously very low, there had been improvements by
incorporating the townships into service centers such as in Pretoria, where services levels and standards are higher due
to historic factors. However, due to enduring poverty and unemployment, violent crime remains a big threat to democracy
in South Africa. This situation poses posed a serious threat to DG and other sector programs in South Africa as social
violence induces instability in economic and social activities and could very easily escalate into political violence, as
happened in regions such as Kwazulu-Natal in 1993-1994.
The situation has remained more stable for electoral processes and competition in that political conflict has been
contained and managed through legitimate electoral processes and electoral violence has been low.1 There have been
two successful general elections (i.e. 1994 and 1999), including national, provincial, and local government elections.
Given the development of democratic institutions in South Africa over the last decade, the current Mission’s position is
that fundamental gains have been consolidated in electoral democracy and thus USAID will not provide any assistance to
electoral activities. However, the lack of a strong, credible opposition party remains a concern for the development of
democracy in the country. Several minor political parties exist but they have small constituency bases when compared
with the current ruling party – they therefore pose no challenge or credible countervailing power.
Finally, the coordinated voice of civil society of the late pre-transition and early transition period (1990-1995) no longer
exists and civil society remains in a state of flux since most of its leadership has been absorbed into government or
business. While civil society has made great strides in some sectoral issues – e.g. HIV/AIDS – it has been less
successful on other issues, such as land reform, where the conflict potential is much more immediate given events in
Zimbabwe. In addition, civil society’s role in policy remains marginal and its watchdog role has severely eroded due to the
departure of experienced leaders into politics, business or government. In other conflict areas, the CSO role in
moderating voices and demands and in mitigating violence is widely recognized in South Africa. For instance, civil society
organizations are credited with establishing a new level of tolerance such that when a person dies in contentious
circumstances (e.g. police custody, racially or ethnically-toned confrontation, etc.) there is no longer the kind of violent
uproar and retaliatory action of the late apartheid and early post-apartheid periods. Such achievements can be credited to
local peace and development organizations which have contributed to a decrease in destabilizing public outbursts by
training community leaders and building levels of tolerance for different political views and values and for due process.
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ANALZING THE DATA
Every team member will have different work styles and every team will work together differently.
However, it is recommended that team members meet at regular intervals to monitor the data collection
process to make adjustments to the interview protocol, particularly the specific questions that need to be
answered, and to adjust the list of key informants and categories of stakeholders who are to be
interviewed. The team should also meet regularly to provide each other updates on their findings, to
undertake a joint analysis of the findings, to discuss the implications of the findings for the
recommendations, and to engage in a joint process of developing the recommendations. This is rarely a
linear process, but does require frequent interaction to revisit and refine the emerging findings, the
analysis, and the recommendations.
DEVELOPING RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of the CVA with regard to the sources of conflict and the existing capacities for peaceful
management of conflicts provide the basis for making recommendations to the Mission. The basic
concern here is: in view of the specific conflict sources and peace capacities that were uncovered through
the conflict vulnerability assessment, what programs may already be addressing them effectively, what
gaps exist, and what program changes or new interventions are needed? It is usually beyond the capacity
of CVAs to do an in-depth assessment of the impacts of individual programs on conflict and peace. Thus,
those tasks are discussed in Part II in more depth as part of the process of designing and implementing
conflict-sensitive programs and strategies. However, CVAs should go as far as they can beyond
identifying the sources of conflict and peace to make at least preliminary recommendations about their
apparent implications for the Mission’s programming.
MAPPING AND MATCHING
A useful way to quickly identify where specific changes in existing USAID programming may be needed
is to “map” the problem focuses of the existing USAID development programs and “match” those focuses
against the causes of conflict identified by the CVA. 14 This mapping and matching can identify where
USAID programs already may be reducing the causes of violence and bolstering peace capacities -whether consciously and intentionally or not – and also where gaps exist and thus new initiatives might be
warranted. Because most major USAID programs are likely to have some bearing on the causes of
conflict identified by a CVA, it is important to look at every active program sector as to its positive or
negative effects on conflict sources or peace capacities, rather than assuming that some program sectors
are more relevant to conflict than others.
Table II-A illustrates in a hypothetical case how such an exercise could bring to light whether certain
illustrative conflict causes might uncover programming gaps and potential areas for new program efforts.
As shown in the right column, several existing programs at least appear to be addressing three of the
causes of conflict that were identified by the CVA (see left column). However, no USAID programs are
addressing the conflict risks stemming from limited minority representation in government or the corrupt,
ineffective police force. Thus, the report should point out these gaps and advise where and what kinds of
programs might fill them.
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TABLE I-B: MAPPING WHETHER USAID PROGRAMS MATCH THE CAUSES OF
CONFLICT
WHAT ARE THE CONFLICT CAUSES
IDENTIFIED BY THE CVA?
Executive branch domination (An institutional risk
factor)

•
•
•

Compliant judiciary
Weak independent media
Divided, ineffective political parties

Limited minority representation

Corruption and lack of accountability at local and
national levels

Weak, ethnically segmented civil society

Corrupt, ineffective police force

IS A USAID PROGRAM ADDRESSING THIS
CAUSE?

•
•
•

Partner A’s judicial development
Internews media strengthening
Partner B’s parliamentary program

•

None

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Fiscal Reform Project
Local Governance Initiative
Tax/fiscal reform and decentralization
Regulatory Reform
SME Regulatory Reform Project
Civil Society Support Centers
Partner C’s Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society
Grants program
None

WRITING THE REPORT
At the initial TPM, the team will have produced a draft outline of the CVA report and each team member will have
taken responsibility for writing specific sections of the report. Some of these may change after the research has

been conducted as new information requires a modified outline, and as individual team members gain
knowledge about specific topics. Some individuals may be in a better position to write some sections
than others. Generally, the team leader will be responsible for putting all the pieces together.
Ideally, an initial draft of the report will be written before the team leaves the country. This initial draft
may be no more than a list of bullet points with the main findings and the main recommendations. It is
recommended that the team debrief the Mission and present these findings and recommendations, before
the next draft of the report is submitted to the Mission for review. This will save both the team and the
Mission time spent writing and reviewing a report that does not meet the Mission’s needs.
The Mission may also wish the team to make a formal presentation to a larger audience before leaving the
country. This presentation may include members of the US Mission to that country, representatives of the
host country government, other donors, and implementing partners. This may be the case if the Mission is
already engaged in or planning to engage in collaborative planning with other stakeholders. It may also be
called for if the Mission has requested that the report include recommendations not only for USAID, but
also for other donors, the host government, and/or implementing partners. These occasions provide
further opportunities for engaging audiences in ways that can encourage their buy-in to the assessment.
A critical decision will involve how to handle sensitive information in the report and in oral briefings. It is
important to find a balance between a report that can be distributed to and utilized by a wide range of
stakeholders, and a report that has been sanitized to the point that it contains little useful information. In
some cases, it may be desirable to prepare two reports – one for external distribution and one for internal
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or selective distribution. When writing the report, great care must be taken to ensure that the document
remains unclassified. The report may include a supplement that contains classified information for
internal use only.
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PART II: CONFLICT-SENSITIVE
PROGRAM DESIGN,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND STRATEGY
DEVELOPMENT
As presented in Part I, the CVA has applied a specified framework of questions to identify immediate and
more basic sources of existing or potential violent conflicts in a country or region, as well as the
capacities for peace. It has also done a quick “mapping” of the existing USAID programs and judged
whether they appear to be helping to reduce those sources of conflict or to strengthen the capacities for
peace. Based on these analyses, the CVA makes recommendations for action to the Mission or other
intended users of the CVA report.
Once the CVA report is complete, the Mission or Regional Office should then use it to inform the design
and implementation of its programs, projects, and activities and the country strategic plan. As introduced
earlier, the basic idea of conflict-sensitive programming is that there should be specific logical and
operational implications of the findings of a CVA for the programs that Missions and Regional Offices
design, implement, monitor, and evaluate. Because the CVA has undertaken only a quick review of
existing programs in order to make its recommendations, the second major stage in conflict-sensitive
programming involves a more complete, in-depth examination of existing programs and the formulation
and implementation of specific changes where needed to respond to the findings of CVA, including
possibly adding new programs.
The central aim in designing a conflict-sensitive program and/or strategy is that it decreases or eliminates
the causes of violent conflict or that it increases or builds the capacities for peace. Program designers
need to look at the causes of conflict and peace as identified by the conflict vulnerability assessment and
consider what changes to existing activities and/or new activities can have an impact on them. The
criteria for designing successful interventions are the “reducers” of the causes of a given conflict and the
“magnifiers” of the causes of peace that are operating in that particular conflict.
Ideally, this stage begins when all sectoral diagnostic assessments such as conflict as well as DG and
other assessments have been completed and the Mission is developing its country strategy, and thus
simultaneously, its SOs, IRs, and indicators for monitoring and evaluation. Program planners are advised
to approach the process of designing a conflict-sensitive program and strategy ideally by considering what
should be done before considering what can be done. Then they can turn to whether and how what should
be done can be done. Given limited resources, the how of programming is best addressed by first
carefully designing USAID programs in a conflict-sensitive manner and also collaborating with other
actors to divide responsibilities for different interventions.
Accordingly, this Part lays out the tasks in moving from CVA findings and recommendations to
formulating and implementing conflict-sensitive programs and overall multi-program strategies. Drawn
from experience in Africa and other regions in conflict analysis and peacebuilding programming, this
guidance also can inform the preparing of concept papers, the parameters cable, and writing scopes of
work (SOWs) for request for proposals (RFPs) and requests for applications (RFAs). To respond to the
CVA, this stage of conflict-sensitive program design and implementation involves the following steps and
issues:
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1. Designing Program Changes: What specific conflict-sensitive modifications in the existing
programs, or additions through new programs, are needed, if any?
2. Strategy Development: How can the programs be combined and sequenced so as to form a
coherent, multi-sectoral approach to reducing conflict and building peace?
3. Encouraging Multi-Partner Engagement: In addition to USAID programs, which other USG and
other actors can be encouraged to focus needed programs on the conflict causes and peace
capacities?
4. Implementing Programming Changes: Can the old or new programs be feasibly implemented so
as to be conflict-sensitive under the existing political and resource context, and if so, how should
they be implemented?
The following sections outline the steps through which USAID programs can begin to break into the
chain of events that fuel conflict. The examples presented are not exhaustive and do not include many
important areas of intervention. They are meant only to illustrate some of the ways programs might be
modified in environments of conflict and some of the issues that need to be considered.

A. DESIGNING CONFLICT-SENSITIVE PROGRAMS
ASSESSING EXISTING PROGRAMS
It is crucial to follow up the mapping and matching exercise described in Part I with a more detailed look
at each of the programs that appear to be addressing sources of conflict or capacities of peace. Just
because a program is ostensibly directed at a problem area that has been identified as a conflict cause does
not necessarily mean that the program is in fact actually affecting that conflict cause. Consider the
importance of whether the programs are appropriately targeted, geographically and/or in terms of
population categories. For example, a youth employment program in a region that is not at high risk for
violence may be a good development program, but unless it is geared toward youth who have an incentive
to participate in violence, it is not doing conflict management. As a result, to determine whether a
program that is addressed to a conflict cause is in fact affecting it in the way desired, requires a closer
look at several dimensions of the program.
Hence, the first major task in designing conflict-sensitive programming is to consider what, if any,
specific conflict-sensitive modifications may be needed in existing programs. Many facets of those
programs may determine whether they are effecting a given cause of a conflict. These aspects include the
program’s timing, geographic location, specific target groups, magnitudes, distribution of benefits, hiring
practices, and several other aspects. The concrete operational changes that might be needed in existing
programs may include, for example:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Increasing or decreasing support for existing programs
Expanding or reducing program activities
Terminating specific programs
Restructuring program activities
Changing program locations
Changing target populations
Changing implementing partners
Changing program staff
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DESIGN CRITERIA FOR CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY
The central issue to consider is whether existing programs are adequately addressing and influencing the
identified causes of conflict and capacities of peace. This analytical process can begin by a thorough
evaluation of the following questions:
•
•
•

Are programs addressing the causes of conflict? If so, which ones?
Are programs building or strengthening the causes of and capacities for peace? If so, which ones?
Are there causes of conflict or causes of peace that are not being addressed?

More specifically, certain conflict-sensitive criteria can be applied to a program design. These design
criteria help to identify whether specific causal linkages are operating between the features of a program
and the causes of conflict and capacities for peace. The best way to ascertain in a given situation whether
existing programs are currently helping the cause of conflict reduction and building peace is to “test” it
through applying the criteria by which to judge success. For example, a program may be able to reduce a
key cause of the conflict if it:
•
•
•
•
•

Contributes to the development of structures and processes for handling grievances, disputes, and
conflicts through peaceful means
Contributes to a culture of peace, reinforces important societal values, and tackles ethical norms
conducive to peace.
Connects to interventions at other levels from community, sub-regional, national, regional, and
international.
Supports people to resist, or directly thwarts, violence and provocations to violence
Contributes to people’s security and sense of security

As seen here, USAID programs might aim to address the structural causes, the proximate or accelerating
causes, or the triggers of a conflict (See Appendix II).
By the same token, programs can strengthen peace capacities that may operate on all those levels.
Employing a positive approach builds on local peace capacities in that it focuses on what contributes to
peace in a situation, not only on what contributes to conflict. A positive approach is not meant to suggest
that the causes of conflict can be ignored, or that it is unnecessary to focus on solving those problems. It
simply means that an important place to start in designing interventions lies with what already may be
working well in a given context.
In short, program designers should be explicit about at which level or levels of causality programs are
expected to have an impact. As discussed more fully under implementation below, they must also ask
themselves whether it is feasible for USAID to have an impact at the level which they are designing
programs to address.
AVOIDING HARM
It is important to consider whether existing programs are “doing harm” by worsening the sources of
conflicts or weakening the capacities in society for managing them in a peaceful manner. To consider
how development action can worsen conflicts, it is useful to consider the policy instruments that aid
agencies typically employ in the course of development work and how they may contribute to conflict.
Some of these common interventions include:
•
•

Technical economic advice, such as those relating to fiscal and monetary policies
Promoting centralization or decentralization of governmental authority in various contexts
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•
•
•

Allocating resources geographically, through the sites selected for social or economic
development assistance or the type of economic development assistance, in ways that may
privileges one geographical location over another
Influencing the uses of revenues from natural resources, such as fossil fuels, minerals, forests, and
water in Africa
Privatization, especially if the economic opportunities generated are not or are not perceived to be
transparent and/or equitable

Inadvertently, such routine USAID and other donors’ program decisions may be causing harm in terms of
conflict and peace. Unfortunately, conventional opinion or program distribution surveys, for example,
often may be “conflict-blind” because they do not detect such adverse impacts. For example, they do not
disaggregate their data in terms of the ethnic, religious, racial, regional or other relevant group identities
that have often been the most critical constituencies for or parties to conflicts. Gender and Development
(GAD) and certain ethically-sensitive approaches to assessment, design, implementation, and monitoring
and evaluation, may provide more sensitive tools for assessing whether programs are conflict-reductive or
conflict-promoting.
PEACE AND CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT
To get a firm handle on such impacts, ideally, peace and conflict impact assessments (PCIAs) should be
carried out prior to program design and implementation. That way, conflict and peace criteria can be
brought to bear on the details of programs. A PCIA is a comprehensive, in depth method for determining
the effects of an intervention specifically on conflict and/or peace. PCIAs marry the relatively new goals
of conflict and peacebuilding with the long-established methods of program evaluation, in order to apply
conflict and peace impact criteria to development programs. PCIAs evaluate an actual or proposed action
(program, project, etc.) in terms of whether it does/can actually decrease or eliminate the causes of the
conflict or increase or build capacities for peace. Done at this stage, PCIAs are used to gauge the
prospective impacts of programs being considered, and thus before they are put into operation.
However, unless PCIAs already have been completed by the time that these design tasks arise, it may be
too difficult or costly to do them for all the programs in a Mission’s portfolio before deciding what
program changes are needed. Nevertheless, over time, the findings from such conflict-sensitive PCIAtype program evaluations will accumulate. These can be filed and synthesized into case histories
documenting what kinds of interventions are successful under different circumstances.
DESIGNING NEW INTERVENTIONS
Since it is unlikely that changes in existing programming alone will adequately address all the major
causes of conflict or capacities of peace identified in a CVA, another task is to suggest new areas and
methods of intervention into the conflict situation. The range of programs that might possibly be
appropriate in a given conflict situation is very broad. Program designers should feel encouraged to
consider innovative options that may lie outside the normal scope of a Mission’s existing program
portfolio (see textbox).
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INNOVATIVE REINTEGRATION PROGRAM:
WILDERNESS PROJECT (NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD TRUST IN SOUTH AFRICA)
Young people who are former enemies from the same community are brought together on a seven-day
‘Transformation Trail’. The project aims to contribute to the building of a culture of peace in the community by
addressing individual healing, reconciliation between opposing groups, and re-integration with the community.
Conventional types of therapeutic intervention appeared unsuccessful because of the young people's suspicion
of authority figures, the fear of having to reveal their role in the killings, and the perception that therapy is for
‘mad’ people. Wilderness Therapy was seen to be sufficiently robust. The physical obstacles, challenges,
achievements and their parallel psychological equivalents are dealt with in terms of the same process. The Trail
includes a night in sacred Bushmen caves - a site of healing trance dance. To reframe the community's
perception of the criminalized young people, the project draws on a tradition of millennia that affords heroic status
to individuals returning to a community from the wilderness. After the Trail, participants become involved in an
ongoing support programmed comprising informal counseling, life skills workshops, job and entrepreneurial-skills
training. Participants have grouped together to form small businesses. Some earn their living as Trail assistants.
An informal club was established, allowing youths to continue building relationships and become involved in
cultural activities and community development projects (Robertson 1999).

To illustrate the great variety of programs that might be appropriate, it is useful to list as in Table II-A
some of the more obvious kinds of programs that have already been used to address conflicts by USAID
and other actors. The menu is not complete but only suggestive of the multi-sectoral options that may be
applicable in conflict situations, if tailored in particular ways to fit each context.
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Table II-A:
A Menu of Sectoral Conflict Mitigation Programs
To address structural socio-economic causes:
Economic and Social Development Instruments
• Infrastructure rehabilitation projects
• Community development projects
• Conditional economic aid
• Targeted anti-poverty programs
• Economic sanctions
• Enterprise development
• Micro-credit programs
• Basic social services (health, education)
• Grassroots dialogues
• Scientific or functional cooperation
Humanitarian Instruments
• Humanitarian relief aid
• Conditional relief assistance
• Refugee and IDP assistance
• Reintegration programs
• Humanitarian law and codes of conduct
• International humanitarian law advocacy
and promotion
• Refugee education and job training
To address proximate political and institutional
factors:
Human Rights Instruments
• Reporting and dialogue regarding human
rights standards (e.g., UN Treaty Bodies)
• Special country and thematic rapporteurs
• Technical cooperation for human rights
capacity-building (e.g., human rights
education, specialized training for judges,
army and police)
• National human rights institutions
• Visits of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights
• Human rights monitoring
• Civilian volunteer witnesses
• Indigenous dispute resolution processes
• International Commissions of Inquiry
• International Criminal Court
• International War Crimes Tribunals
• Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
• Special Commissions and Inquiries
• Human Rights Ombudsmen
• Domestic NGO watchdog organizations
Political Development, Governance and Education
Instruments
• Democratic institution capacity-building

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Election observation and assistance
Legislative assistance
Judiciary reform
Legal reform
Peace commissions and committees
Executive capacity-building
National conferences and civil society
assemblies
• Peace education in schools
• Peace campaigns
• Peace and reconciliation radio
• Civic education
To address accelerators and triggers:
Diplomatic and Judicial Instruments
• Special envoys
• Good offices
• Enquiry
• Conciliation
• Mediation
• Negotiations
• Unofficial political/policy dialogues
• Peace commissions and committees
• Confidence and security building measures
• Conciliatory gestures
• Methodical crisis consultations
• Fact-finding missions
• Civilian volunteer witnesses
• Political observers
• Arbitration
• Institutionalized collective bargaining
• Judicial settlement
• Non-violent action methods and training
Military Instruments
• Preventive disarmament
• Small arms controls
• Arms embargoes
• Demobilization
• Preventive deployment
• Confidence and security building measures
• Security sector reform
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The inventorying of possible options can be very well served by a careful reading of the several program
toolkits that USAID/CMM is developing for different sectors. To assist Missions in identifying what
kinds of approaches and specific programs might be best suited for certain causes of conflict and in
designing appropriate conflict-sensitive programs, USAID/CMM is developing a set of issues-oriented
menus of especially promising approaches. The purpose of the toolkits is to present concise introductions
to the linkages between, on the one hand, typical problem and programming areas out of which conflicts
can arise, such as land, youth, oil, mineral, forests, livelihoods, gender, local government, and religion,
and, on the other hand, the options and USAID program offices and technical staff might choose for
conflict-sensitive programmatic interventions. The content of the toolkits is based on field experiences,
best practices and lessons learned by USAID and other members of the development community and is
presented in user-friendly formats for both generalists and sectoral experts who do not have backgrounds
in peace and conflict programming. In addition, the toolkits will provide survey indicators for assessing
the peace and conflict impacts relevant to specific sectors, and further organizational and individual
resources to consult and their contact information.
KEY DESIGN GUIDELINES
Programs can target causes of conflict and capacities for peace at the international, regional, national, subregional, or community levels. Usually, the sources of conflicts arise from several of these levels
simultaneously, and it is the interactions between these levels that drive a conflict to expand in scope and
to increase in intensity. The main entry point of some programs is regional or national level decisionmakers; others target mid-level actors, such as city officials, members of the media, religious leaders,
business leaders, or academics; and still others target community level actors and/or individual
households. To be effective, interventions will ideally aim to have an impact at several of these levels:
program effects may be expected to “trickle down” or “trickle up.” In any case, it is important that there
is clarity about the programs’ actual and potential impacts at these various levels.
A related design issue often overlooked is the scale of a conflict. As shown in Appendix II, conflicts may
operate primarily on different local, national and regional political levels or scales, although factors at the
other levels may contribute. A key question is: In view of the scope of a conflict, what should be the
scope of the various intervention(s) intended to address it? In a given country or region, violence may
occur repeatedly in a single local geographical area; it may be widespread throughout a country or region;
or it may occur at different locations at different times. “Boomerang” conflicts are conflicts in which the
occurrence of violence in one location leads to violence in other locations throughout a country or in a
neighboring country that have parallel identity groups residing in them. In Nigeria or South Africa,
violence between ethnic groups in one city often results in violence between the same ethnic groups in
other cities. Also in Africa, local and national conflicts are often cross-border, meaning that they occur in
the adjacent sub-regions of two or more countries. The conflicts that occur in the ethnic Somali-inhabited,
adjacent sub-regions of Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia are an example of cross-border conflicts. Although
such violence may occur in specific locations, the causes of the conflicts may be located elsewhere – in
the capital city, in a neighboring country, or in the global arena.
However, the scope of the conflict does not necessarily dictate the scope of an intervention. It is generally
not necessary, desirable, or possible to implement programs in every location in which violence occurs.
Whenever possible, programs can be implemented in the locations at which the contributing causes of the
conflicts are located, as well as in the locations in which its manifestations in violence occur.
“Boomerang” conflicts may require strategic programs in key locations, which if resolved there, will have
a positive “boomerang” impact in other locations. Cross-border conflicts may require coordination
between two or more USAID country offices, coordination between two or more governments (which

DOCUMENT TITLE

1

USAID can facilitate), or coordination between two or more partners or stakeholders located in two or
more countries.
As mentioned in Part I and elaborated in Appendix II, whether specific interventions are appropriate also
depends greatly on the point in the conflict cycle at which they would come into play. Different phases of
peace and conflict call for different priorities in the types of programming that are likely to be most costeffective. For example, in conditions of sustainable peace, existing peace capacities can be identified and
bolstered, and development programs can be vigilant in avoiding any tendency to worsen the conditions
that generate conflict. In a latent conflict or pre-violent conflict phase, programs can focus on building
peace capacities and mechanisms for handling emerging conflicts, disputes, and grievances through
peaceful means, while simultaneously tackling the structural causes of conflict. In a manifest violent
conflict phase, programs have the greatest challenges. They will be most effective if they simultaneously
contribute to ending violence and tackling the structural and relational causes of the conflict in addition to
addressing any resulting humanitarian crises. For violence itself creates new grounds for further violence,
as relational causes of conflict compound and complicate structural causes of conflict. In post-conflict and
recovery settings, programs will have to focus on rebuilding institutional structures in ways that will
create sustainable peace and on rebuilding and reconciling relationships between formerly antagonistic
segments of the population.15
Seizing the opportunity to prevent latent conflict from turning into manifest or violent conflict deserves
particular attention. By investing resources strategically to prevent violence from occurring in the first
place, or from escalating significantly in intensity and scope, from threatening the basic integrity of states,
or from spilling over into neighboring states, it is possible to prevent the necessity of spending far greater
resources later.

B. DEVELOPING CONFLICT-SENSITIVE STRATEGIES
As discussed so far, mainstreaming conflict-sensitive programming means addressing the causes and
consequences of conflict through designing the particulars of individual programs. By extension, it means
examining each program sector, one after the other, and thus enhancing the potential of each sectors’
contribution to peace. In this way, conflict and peacebuilding goals can be mainstreamed throughout
USAID’s portfolio.
Every USAID Mission funds activities that have at least some impact on the causes of conflict and the
causes of peace and it is important to apply a ‘conflict lens’ to every sector, rather than assuming that
some sectors are more relevant than others. In making program specific changes, it is important to
remember that the conflicts being addressed in a CVA are often very complex. They do not occur simply
because people are unhappy or greedy, or simply because a country happens to have guns flowing in, or
simply because valuable minerals might encourage or sustain violence. Nor do they happen everywhere
state and social institutions are weak or perverse. Usually, major conflicts happen when causes found at
multiple levels come together and reinforce each other. They are ultimately the result of particular
congruencies of chronic grievances, political and economic competition, irresponsible political
leadership, weak and unaccountable institutions, particular provocative events, and global and regional
forces. Thus, the causes of conflict can be found to impact every sector of society in some way.
For example, identity-based conflict is generally based on egregious, chronic inequalities between groups
that permeate every aspect of life in society, including economic, political, and social. In Africa, such
inequalities tend to be based on tribal or clan identities, and are often the legacy from colonial policies
that promoted one or more tribes or clans over others or from the political or economic life of a country
having been dominated by one tribe or clan for long periods following independence.
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Consequently, such inequality will have an impact in the sectors in which USAID and other international
donors and NGOs work, including democracy and governance, agriculture, health, education, and so on.
Although the priorities will depend on the nature, locus, and stage of particulat conflict situations, conflict
and peacebuilding programming should be multi-sectoral, in order to address the causes and
consequences of conflict in each sector and to enhance the potential of each sector to contribute to peace.
Effective interventions cannot be based on activities that focus on a single dimension of conflict, such as
ethnic tensions or political exclusion. Nor can they usually be based at a single level, for example at the
community level or the national level, since gains in one area may be so easily undermined by setbacks in
another. It is important to think about how problems manifest themselves at all of these levels, and how
solutions can be strengthened or built at each.
Viewing development, transition, and humanitarian assistance through a ‘conflict lens’ means recognizing
that every decision and every activity, whether at the macro level, through policies, or the micro level has
the potential to contribute to conflict or to peace. While policy and operational decisions can create
winners and losers, conflict-sensitive programming can enhance the possibility of arriving at win-win
decisions.
SCALING UP
Acting effectively also requires constructing an overall strategy in which “the whole is greater than the
parts.” Most policy-oriented conflict analysts now recognize that effectiveness occurs only when
appropriate combinations or packages of particular measures have been taken. None is likely to be
effective in isolation from other interventions. While a sector-by-sector design process is undertaken to
ensure that the existing programs address causes of conflicts and peace capacities and new ones are added
to fill any gaps, the overall aim should be to achieve a unified “package” of measures that covers all the
bases – i.e. that addresses all the short and longer term forces that are driving the conflict and the viable
processes that can help manage it, as identified in the CVA. Without this integrated approach in mind
when designing a strategy, it is possible that separate activities may work at cross-purposes, and thus
undermine each other, even though individually they may be conflict-sensitive in their own ways.

To illustrate the need for achieving impacts at the overall aggregate level, it is useful to mention
the findings from research that has sought to determine which mixes of programming approaches
may generally maximize the effectiveness of conflict transformation and peacebuilding.
Practitioners from a wide variety of organizations working in the areas of peacebuilding,
humanitarian assistance, and development were asked by Collaborative for Development
Assistance, Inc. which approaches they believe are the most effective. The replies were classified
along two basic dimensions: a) whether they targeted more people or key people (thus
corresponding roughly to the political scales of conflict listed in Appendix II; and b) whether
they aimed to influence individuals or society more broadly (thus corresponding to the sources of
conflict listed in Appendix II). The different approaches were placed in the appropriate category,
as shown in the chart below.

Individuals’ personal attitudes and
behavior
Society’s structures and processes

MORE PEOPLE

KEY PEOPLE

Distance learning modules for
skills training
Media projects

Problem-solving dialogues for
top political officials
Legal assistance for
accessing a government
ministry’s services
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None of the approaches in the boxes was judged to be effective if used alone. For example, any work that
stayed with an individual or personal focus remained there. Similarly, work with a few elite individuals
that was not linked to broader processes affecting larger numbers also was relatively incomplete. It was
concluded that movement from one box to another was what began to demonstrate effectiveness.
SEQUENCING
The development of an appropriate strategy also requires attention to the sequencing of various
interventions. Programs differ greatly in terms of the timetable through which they can be expected to
achieve their goals. Which of the programs aim to build long-term sustainable peace for the next
generation? Which aim to build peace and prevent conflict in the medium-term, such as by building and
consolidating the rule of law within five years? Which aim to prevent violence in the short-term, for
example, by establishing community dispute resolution or peace committees, or by engaging potential
conflict entrepreneurs within two years? Do any aim to work directly with international peacekeepers or
security forces to attempt to bring about an immediate end to violence and limit overall casualties of
violence? Whether interventions are to be applied concurrently or sequentially will depend not only on
the stage of the conflicts, but also the available resources.
LESSONS LEARNED IN EFFECTIVE CONFLICT PREVENTION
As a guide to the kinds of packages of measures or mixes of programs at different levels that may
constitute effective holistic strategies, USAID practitioners can draw on the accumulating policy research
that has examined and compared several actual efforts at conflict prevention or post-conflict
peacebuilding. Although not generally used so far by development practitioners in developing mission
strategies, this work has proceeded for some years at the macro-level, rather than starting as most existing
evaluation does at the program or project level. Thus, some research has looked at cases where several
international actors have carried out in a given country various conflict prevention activities that include
several types of development, diplomatic and other policy instruments. There are two case-study
literatures on these multilateral engagements -- one focused on potential conflict situations where no
recent conflict has occurred; and the other on post-conflict.
Conveniently, efforts have been made to synthesize the findings of this literature into useful guidelines for
developing effective conflict-sensitive portfolios. The conclusions in this work can be used as a kind of
“checklist” to determine how well a Mission’s strategy “stacks up” in terms of having the appropriate
overall mix of elements and in a plausible sequence. Critical intervention factors that help to avoid
escalation of conflicts into violence have to do with when preventive action is taken, what kinds of action
are taken, who takes action, and how action is taken.
To illustrate, the following discussion pulls together some of the preliminary contingent generalizations
on what mix and sequence of interventions is likely to be effective for preventing violence to erupt in
potential violent conflict settings. Serious intra-state political tensions and issues will tend to be addressed
more peacefully and avoid escalation into violence or armed action to the extent that the following factors
are present: 16
FEATURES OF THE ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITY
1. Timely, early action is taken when tensions are emerging, or immediately after initial outbreaks of
violence, but before significant political violence or armed conflict occurs.
2. Engagement prioritizes the objectives of preventing violence, managing open disputes, and building
encompassing institutions -- i.e., direct and structural prevention -- in contextually-appropriate mixes
and sequences, preferably tied in with some domestic political or peace compact. In particular:
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•

•

•

•
•

•
•
•
•

•

Behaviors and actions that threaten immediate loss of life and destruction are deterred or stopped
before more fundamental constitutional issues and socio-economic conditions are addressed.
Ensuring a minimum level of order and security is a priority before preventive action can achieve
other social or political goals such as development and negotiations can make much progress.
Support and protection is provided to buttress or create formal governing institutions by
incorporating the leaders of the main contending groups in power-sharing, in rough proportion to
their influence in the society. But this should not simply reinforce either an exclusionary
governmental structure or an anti-state political opposition. Conditional aid is used as an
incentive to promote and reward peaceful management of political issues.
This early diplomatic action is robust rather than half-hearted and equivocal, and targets vigorous
positive and negative inducements on the conflicting parties’ leaders and their rank and file, such
as targeted sanctions and threatened military deployment. It also needs to include ongoing
mediation or facilitation of the particular political and policy disputes that inevitably arise so they
do not escalate into destabilizing confrontations.
Early engagement is also even-handed: it does not solely promote the cause of the weaker parties
in the conflict but also addresses the fears and insecurities of dominant parties.
Legitimate and responsible state organs and the security forces are assisted to provide public
services widely and professionally. These measures enable the state to become the host of
peaceful give-and-take politicking over public policy and the settling of basic constitutional
issues and the vehicle for providing public services that benefit the general population.
These short-term direct prevention efforts are followed shortly by visibly vigorous structural
prevention actions that credibly are tackling more fundamental issues. In particular, programs to
increase employment and income are started promptly.
Economic reform measures aimed at encouraging public sector efficiency and markets, thus
possibly reducing the size of government, are timed to factor in their possible impacts on
reducing essential services and increasing social strains and inter-group disparities.
Opportunities to join regional security alliances and trade cooperation are pursued as crucial
incentives for reinforcing an internal climate of popular and elite support for building legitimate
and peaceful states.
Outside formal government, a broad-based constituency for peace is mobilized to the extent
possible. Peaceful “people power” campaigns are supported through training opposition leaders
in non-violent tactics and non-incendiary rhetoric, but that exert significant pressure on
incumbent leaders to take peaceful, responsible actions or retire from office.
Over time, a politically active but independent civil society is encouraged that cuts across
society’s politicized identity groups, that is not solely interested in politics, is primarily interested
in delivery of public services, wealth creation and business activities, and that thus has a vested
interest in stability and prosperity.

2. The preventive action thus applies an appropriate mix of sufficiently vigorous (conditional) carrots,
(unconditional) support, actual or threatened sticks, diplomacy to create contact and communication
for negotiating space, and other modes of influence to bear on the most important short and long-term
sources of conflicts and players. Hence, a sufficient number and type of governmental and nongovernmental actors must implement international preventive engagements, so as to provide the range
of needed prevention instruments (mediation, deterrence, institution-building, etc.) and resources
needed to address the leading short and long-term sources of the conflict. Any single international
actor or action can rarely prevent violent conflicts.
3. Early multi-faceted action is concerted and consistent, rather than scattered or contradictory. Various
domestic and international actors form a critical mass that visibly demonstrates a significant
commitment to non-violent change.
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4. The engagement is supported politically and in other ways, or at least tolerated and not blocked or
undermined by major regional or world powers.
5. The engagement is generally viewed as legitimate by being carried out under the aegis of the UN or a
regional organization involving the states affected.
FAVORABLE CONTEXTUAL FEATURES
Other crucial factors to take into account that affect the degree of difficulty in conflict prevention have to
do with the regional, national, and local settings:
1. Relations between major political groups have been peaceful in the recent past.
2. At least some major factions in the government invite in international assistance or are amenable to it.
Moderate leaders from each of the contending communities are already in positions with governing
authority and in regular contact, have formed political compacts, and show some ability to manage
societal disputes and carry out public policies that benefit all communities, including providing for
physical security.
3. Those countries close to the immediate conflict, such as neighboring states and refugee hosts, are
neutral or promote its peaceful resolution, rather than taking sides politically or militarily.
4. Diasporas support peaceful resolution or at least are not highly mobilized behind contending groups,
and thus do not aid and abet coercive or violent ways to pursue the conflict or lobby their host
governments to take a partisan stance toward it.
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KENYA: WORKING WITH A TRANSITIONING REGIME TO ENSURE NON-VIOLENT
ELECTIONS
At the end of President Daniel arap Moi’s tenure in 2002, the environment of pre-election Kenya was
characterized by violence, entrenched ethnic tension, and both latent and open conflict over land. High stakes,
extra-constitutional and anti-democratic actions increased the dangers of election-related violence. A stagnant
economy, a contentious constitutional reform process, a government radio monopoly, and weak democratic
institutions also exacerbated these dangers. In addition, there was speculation that the ruling party might find a
way to delay the elections or change the constitution to maintain President Moi in office. Historically, the police,
the Attorney General (AG) and the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) reportedly lacked willingness to take
appropriate action to prevent such extra-constitutional steps or contain violence.
Going into such an electoral environment, the goal of USAID was to promote peaceful democratic election in
order to facilitate a stable transition. The USAID Mission staff decided that they could best achieve this objective
by supporting monitoring and reporting on violence in a timely and accurate manner and follow up by convincing
the AG and ECK to act on the reports. Such monitoring would need to cover both the historically problematic and
hotly contested hot spots, but at the same time avoid any appearance of bias on the part of the monitors. To
avoid a perception of bias, a coalition of six Kenyan NGOs joined to implement a substantial violence monitoring
program funded by USAID. They formed a trust to manage and oversee a joint Central Depository Unit (CDU) on
election violence and installed active monitors in all provinces ten months prior to the election.1 The CDU also
disseminated information targeted to the ECK, the media, Members of Parliament, diplomats, and law
enforcement agencies.
The program resulted in a uniform reporting tool that was used and adopted by others. The CSOs greatly
benefited from each other’s experiences and the perception of bias was limited by the collaborative decisionmaking that characterized the CDU’s operations. The CDU was viewed as the key source of information on
electoral violence and intimidation as its data were widely quoted and its personnel interviewed on television. In
the Mission’s evaluation, the CDU positively impacted the ECK by providing the Commission with the concrete
information on which it could base its enforcement actions, thus contributing to a reduction of potential violence.
(For example, the ECK threatened to disqualify parties and candidates credibly tied to violence now much more
easily traceable.) The diplomatic community also used the CDU data to press for more aggressive action by the
government, political parties, and other institutions to contain pockets of violence that erupted in the pre-election
season. The program also enhanced the availability and debate/discussion of information/opinion polls on the
elections and also in the building of trust between the ECK, political parties, and the media.

INTEGRATING CONFLICT-SENSITIVE STRATEGIES INTO STRATEGIC PLANS
Program designers then need to relate their plans to an existing strategic plan of the Mission. USAID
Strategic Plans represent a commitment to a set of Strategic Objectives (SOs) and Intermediate Results
(IRs) to be accomplished by a Mission or Regional Office. USAID recognizes both Standard Strategic
Plans and Interim Strategic Plans. Standard Strategic Plans are used in politically and economically stable
countries and regions for sustainable development environments with new or continuing programs.
Interim Strategic Plans may be used for transition environments with new or continuing programs, for
countries experiencing political, economic, or military instability, and for crisis and post-crisis settings.
In making its recommendations, CVA teams are encouraged to fold as many as possible into a Mission’s
existing SOs. While some countries may need (or be willing to consider) a stand-alone special objective
the central goal of conducting conflict assessments is to demonstrate how traditional development and
humanitarian assistance can be used to address the various causes of conflict. In general, programs should
be designed to adapt appropriate existing development, transition, and humanitarian assistance activities
to address the causes of conflict and to build and/or strengthen the capacities for peace. Nevertheless, in
some countries there may be a need for a stand-alone Special Objective (SO) for conflict and
peacebuilding.
SCENARIOS
In highly volatile contexts, Missions may choose to employ scenario-based planning in order to be able to
respond rapidly to changes in the overall country situation or particular areas. Scenario-based planning
enables Missions to engage in crisis intervention in rapidly escalating situations or to seize opportunities
presented by rapidly improving situations. For example, the deployment of international peacekeeping
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troops generally brings about swift and significant changes in USAID’s operating environment. The
following are the different types of scenario-based planning available to Missions: 17
•

•

•

•

Country scenarios help plan for how the USAID program might respond to large changes in an
uncertain country environment. This could include, for example, war versus no war scenarios,
alternative programs for different political or economic outcomes, or improving and deteriorating
scenarios versus a current set of conditions.
Programming scenarios may include different levels or types of programs in relation to changes
in the country scenarios. Changes to the program could include the number and formulation of
Objectives, Results Frameworks, the staff mix and levels, operating expense levels, program
funding accounts and levels, or the Strategic Plan timeframe.
Trigger events. If the Strategic Plan includes contingencies and alternative responses, the
Strategic Plan should also include future events that would cause a special review of the program,
or a previously agreed upon change in program direction in reaction to evolving country
conditions or changing budgets.
Crisis modifier. Some Operating Units in crisis-prone countries, or countries facing longstanding emergencies, have developed creative approaches to dealing with particular uncertainties
that they face in strategic planning. In such countries, it is possible to include a “crisis modifier”
clause in the Strategic Plan to help streamline the planning and implementation processes. The
clause would allow for a redirection of resources when circumstances warrant it.

ZIMBABWE: SCENARIO-BASED PLANNING
The Zimbabwe CVA process relied on scenario-based analysis and program planning. Conducted in January
2003 for a humanitarian assistance strategy, the assessment/planning exercise developed three scenarios with
respective response modalities in programming. Given the volatile situation in Zimbabwe, the CVA team
determined scenario-based planning would be the most useful assessment and programming tool. Each scenario
analyzed various political, economic, legal and social factors and developed indicators that could be used to track
the situation, allowing the Mission to determine on which scenario to base the Mission response.
The Mission developed the scenarios in collaboration with a core group of seven to eight external advisors and
analysts that had been selected by civil-society organizations. The Mission’s CVA team held discussions with this
core group to define the possible scenarios as well as appropriate policies for each. This group also assisted the
Mission in determing which scenario was most likely at any given time and tracking the transition from one
scenario to the next. Given their integral involvement in defining both the scenarios and the sets of
recommendations appropriate for each scenario, this group basically “owns” the DG program, including the
integrated conflict assessment and action plan.
The Mission determined three scenarios as described below.
a) Collapse: This scenario is the stage the group agrees the country is approaching, as indicated by the severe
macro-economic crisis such as the hyperinflation rate (at 400%-600% in 2003), shortages of fuel, power,
essential goods and services, and acute poverty rates of 62-85%. Other indicators suggesting collapse or a fast
trend towards collapse are the increased and intensified rivalries between parties, the use of youth militias to
solve political disputes, the collapse of confidence in state institutions and especially the serious emasculation of
the judiciary.
The response to such a scenario would focus on three primary areas:

♣•

Institution building: CSO capacity building, support to opposition groups and parliament (where the most
credible and somewhat effective opposition and progressive thought remains even under extreme duress)
♣•
Victims of violence: documenting atrocities, exposing perpetrators of human and economic rights
violations and supporting forums for information sharing on human and economic rights; and
♣•
Rule of law: promoting equitable application of the rule of law and supporting the observance of civil and
political rights.
b) Improvement-transitional period: This scenario would be indicated by major transition events such as a
leadership turnover, systemic change toward greater openness, halting collapse and violence, and a reversal of
economic collapse.

Continued on next page
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ZIMBABWE: SCENARIO-BASED PLANNING ~ CONTINUED
The response to such a scenario would include support to:

♣•

Transitional Agenda: Prevention of violence (violence monitors)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Promote media freedom
Repeal repressive legislation (POSA, etc)
Provide limited economic assistance
Promote constitutional reform
Promote electoral law reform
Reform prison system
Strengthen electoral process
Polling agent training
Training of election observers/monitors
Leveling electoral playing field

c) Post-election: This scenario represents the most optimistic outcome and would escalate Mission support to
take advantage of the opportunity for consolidating democratic institutions and practice. Such a scenario would be
in evidence if the regime or its successor indicates a willingness to install fundamental reforms enhancing
democratic governance (including holding free elections) and economic stability and growth. Mission support for
such a scenario would include:

♣•

Rebuilding Civil Society

o
o
o
o
o

Building a new society and decentralization
Race, culture, ethnicity and citizenship programs
Reconciliation, justice, peace-building and human rights observation
Constitution and rule of law program
Accountability/transparency institutions

o
o

Restructuring the role of the state
Civil service reform and capacity building

♣•

Restructuring Government

♣•

Strengthening Parliament
o

Support to committees and legislative process

ENCOURAGING MULTI-PARTNER ENGAGEMENT THROUGH COLLABORATIVE
PARTNERSHIPS
Mainstreaming conflict and peacebuilding through well-designed and well-targeted programs in all
sectors of USAID programming is needed in order to maximize scarce resources, reduce conflict and
build peace. USAID Missions and Regional Offices should work closely with other USAID units
providing assistance in a given country or region, such as the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) or the
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Even if many conflict-sensitive USAID programs are
combined to create holistic strategies, however, they cannot meet all of a country’s possible needs.
Resource constraints limit the number of activities that an individual aid organization can undertake.
There are problems that contribute to conflict and/or are consequences of conflict that lie outside of
USAID’s mandate but are within the mandates of other US government agencies. These include security
sector reform, organized crime, small arms trade, human trafficking, international migration, terrorism,
transitional justice, and other issues. While USAID can address some of the structural and proximate
causes that create these problems, such as relative and absolute poverty, it is often outside USAID’s
mandate to attempt to handle the problems themselves. In these instances, USAID may collaborate
closely to ensure that there is complementarity between its programs and those of other US government
programs, such as those conducted within the Department of State or the Department of Defense.
One of the most agreed-on conclusions of the accumulating research on the effect of donor and other
programs on major political or violent conflict is that more than one program and donor is needed to
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achieve discernible impact. Specific programs may be effective in achieving their particular objectives,
but the overall conflict situation may continue to deteriorate. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of
programming, organizations must engage in macro-evaluation, as opposed to micro-evaluation, and
evaluate more than just a single organization’s individual programs. This can be done at the design stage
prospectively, as well as at the evaluation stage retrospectively.
As a result, it is important for aid organizations and others to divide responsibility, based on their
respective comparative advantages. As USAID is usually only one of many potential partners in a country
or region, both local and international, engaged in conflict and peacebuilding programs in a given country
or region, a division of labor across sectors or geographical regions may be advisable. Multi-leveled and
multi-timeframe programming is more likely to be accomplished not only by mainstreaming conflictsensitivity and peacebuilding into all relevant USAID sectors’ programs, but also by dividing
responsibilities for different timeframe goals with other partners. This is especially important, as there
may be specific interventions that are necessary for sustainable peace, but that USAID is unable to
implement due to constraints on its mandate. For example, in a country in which elections tend to act as a
trigger for inter-communal violence, USAID can work with Elections Boards to establish procedures that
reduce the possibility of violence, but it cannot provide certain types of support to the police that may be
needed to manage violence. For this type of assistance, USAID should reach out to other organizations
capable of meeting this need.
USAID should work with bilateral donors, such as the UK Department for International Development
(DFID), and multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP). International and US NGO implementers of USAID programs as well as
advocates for different constituencies can also be partners. Additionally, host countries are important
partners, although sometimes they may also be parties to conflicts. In most countries in Africa, the USG
signs an agreement with the host country, although there are some exceptions. Finally, local NGOs can
also be both partners and representatives of different constituencies, which may or may not also be parties
to conflicts.
USAID is often extremely well positioned to play an important role in encouraging other organizations to
contribute to peace and managing and mitigating conflict. In contexts in which USAID has a bi-lateral
agreement with the host-government and in which the host-government lacks the political will to change
or address specific conflict generating policies or actions, USAID and other donors can use their leverage
to pressure governments to change or address those policies or actions. Such pressure is generally much
more likely to be effective if it is applied in collaboration with other donors and stakeholders.
When thinking about collaboration with other partners it is important to put to recognize that different
partners have different long-term and short-term goals, different principles and preferences about how to
reach those goals, and differing constraints on what trade-offs are acceptable in the short and long term.
They may also have different assumptions about what is possible, desirable, or morally permissible to
achieve in the social world vis-à-vis peacebuilding and conflict management and mitigation. Partners will
their have different national or faith-based cultures and will have different organizational cultures. Such
differences will not necessarily mean that partnership is undesirable or impossible, but require that
partners have to be explicit about their goals and assumptions, the ways in which there is convergence and
divergence, and the implications for partnership. Inter-organizational research suggests that one of the
best ways to foster collaboration is to engage the various organizations at the beginning in a joint
assessment of a problem – in this case, the sources of conflict in a country. Thus, donors and others
should arrange wherever possible to conduct initial assessments using the same framework, and work
through the other steps in conflict-sensitive programming as well.
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR WORKING WITH PARTNERS
1.1. An initial stakeholder analysis is necessary to so that the strengths and weaknesses of all potential partners can
be analyzed. While some partners have few resources, others may lack capacity or strategies, and others differ
in their perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the conflict parties. These assets and liabilities must be carefully
considered when assessing partner candidates (CIAA, 2000).
2.2. A good relationship between external and internal partners is essential to the success of any intervention.
Usually, the local partner will accept the intervention strategy of outside partners simply because they are in need
of the resources, but this often leads to unsustainable interventions. It is therefore best if both sides are clear
about their respective interests and values (Mott Foundation, 1999).
3.3. For external agencies, it is crucial to work with the right local partners. These partners usually work as
gatekeepers, facilitating communication between external donors and local peace actors. However, while they
are helpful in selecting and supporting local actors, they can also obstruct communication, effectively preventing
the local actors from direct interaction with the donor.
4.4. Finding the right local partners is essential. Experience of the last years has shown that certain groups are
1
particularly well suited for effectively negotiating the challenges of conflict transformation and peace building.
WHERE IS THIS REFERENCE?
5.5. Usually, the best way to select people and organizations is to leave the selection to them. One method of
selection is simply to make inquiries of those involved in a particular intervention area, asking them who are the
relevant actors and which of them would they recommend inviting for a planning exercise. This questioning is
often the beginning of a process that has intrinsic value and that maximizes ownership for all involved.
6.6. Selection criteria should be applied with priority given to local groups. Groups should: support peaceful conflict
transformation; operate within the country; demonstrate self-initiative; have a willingness to make a substantive
contribution to project work; represent the entire spectrum of society (multi-ethnic, gender-balanced, and multisector); maintain independence from governments; approach conflict transformation in a peaceful manner; and

PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES TO STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
Participation of stakeholders in every phase of the programming cycle from assessments to evaluation has
long been recognized by USAID as best practice in development and humanitarian assistance. This
principle also applies to conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding programming. While it is generally agreed
that the principle of collaboration represents the ideal, it is often difficult to implement in reality. This
difficulty may be because the process of participation does not usually start until the programming
process has progressed too far for those involved to be willing or able to exert a meaningful influence.
Participation should start at the assessment phase in order to be effective. In the case of conflict-sensitive
programming that means it must begin with the CVA.
IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMMING CHANGES
Once the Mission or Regional Office has decided on appropriate programming changes, an obvious
related step is deciding whether these changes are feasible and specifically how and when to implement
them, so they operate as desired. Programs must not only be focused on the specific causes of conflict
and peace capacities, they must also be sufficiently capable of realizing their intended impacts.
Implementation thus involves marshalling the necessary financial, human, and organizational resources
and determining what tasks are required and who will carry them out.
CHOOSING IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS
Regardless of the phase in the strategic planning cycle of the Mission or Regional Office, multiple
stakeholders from within the Mission, the US Mission to the country, the host government, other donors,
and implementing partners, can be involved in different phases of the programming cycle. Wherever
possible, it is crucial to support local capacities to analyze conflict, to operate programs, and to conduct
applied research to learn what does and does not work in particular contexts. Local ownership of these
processes is the first step towards ensuring the sustainability of peacebuilding interventions. Local
interveners and parties to conflicts must learn to analyze conflict and design and implement conflict
management and peacebuilding programs themselves, if peace is to be sustainable.
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When choosing implementing partners in deeply divided societies, there is a need to be cognizant of how
civil society is either reinforcing or bridging fault lines between groups. This may require looking
beyond civil society organizations that are “approved” by the state to those who represent voiceless
sectors. It also means avoiding promoting causes that may simply provoke the state to crack down on
society in backlash, for that could easily lead to a destructive spiraling of violence. Special efforts should
be made to identify and support organizations that cross ethnic, economic, or political fault lines.
Some parties with whom programs engage may be legitimate while others may be viewed as less
legitimate parties. While USAID and other partners traditionally work with like-minded organizations
and institutions, if sustainable peace is to be achieved in conflict settings, it may also be necessary to
work with parties to the conflict who are not traditional partners or who are not necessarily like-minded.
In these contexts, the decision to engage with the parties must be made in collaboration with the US
Mission to that country and with USAID/Washington. In sum, given the sensitive nature of conflictsensitive and peacebuilding activities, it is important to consult with the US Embassy and USAID/
Washington, DC before proceeding too far along in the planning process.
CONSISTENCY WITH USAID POLICIES AND PROCESSES
Other important questions relate to USAID’s operational environment. Ultimately, it will be the answers
to these questions that will determine whether or not the recommendations emerging from the CVA can
be acted upon.
•
•
•

At what stage of the strategic planning cycle is the Mission or Regional Office?
Are there resources to implement the recommended activities or suggested modifications to
existing activities? Are there any windows of opportunity for funding?
What are the Mission’s or Regional Office’s existing programs?

Some feasibility criteria have to do with established restrictions arising from USAID programming
policies. For example, it needs to be ensured that programs:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Lie within USAID’s mandate and USG current policy framework
Have available funding
Can be accomplished through USAID funding mechanisms, within a feasible timeframe
Utilize USAID’s comparative advantages
Are feasible in view of host country capacities
Avoid conflicts of interest
Do not involve issues that are within the mandate of the US Department of State or the US
Department of Defense
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PART III. MONITORING AND
EVALUATION (M&E) FOR CONFLICTSENSITIVE PROGRAMMING
A. M&E FOR CONFLICT-SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING
To conduct M&E for conflict-sensitive programming, program planners need to apply the methods of
M&E, but in ways that are sensitive to the particular characteristics and constraints of conflict-affected
contexts.
Monitoring is a method for tracking and assessing the performance of program or project activities in
relation to their intended objectives while they are still being implemented. Its aim is to help to decide
whether changes in the activities should be made. Evaluation also assesses performance but after a
program or project has been completed. Its aim is to see if the programs or projects have achieved what
was expected of them and what factors explain those results. Evaluations can focus on the process of
implementing that activity or on its outcomes, or on both. For long-term programs or projects, those
conducted for five to ten years, a mid-term process or outcome evaluation may be carried out.
Monitoring and evaluation are both used for understanding and managing performance.
USAID has used monitoring and evaluation to contribute information and analysis for a Mission’s Results
Framework (RF). An RF is a system for monitoring and evaluating the results of activities, which it
accomplishes by:
•
•
•

Collecting and analyzing performance information to track progress toward planned results;
Using this performance information to inform decision-making about programming and resource
allocation; and
Communicating the results that were attained and/or not attained so that Missions and other
stakeholders can learn from the experience of applying programs.

USAID Missions or Regional Offices have used Performance Management Plans (PMPs) as a tool for
planning and managing the process of assessing and reporting progress towards achieving their Strategic
Objectives (SOs). A completed PMP will define at least one performance indicator to measure progress
towards the SO, and at least one performance indicator to measure progress towards each Intermediate
Result (IR) in the Results Framework. Each performance indicator will include baseline levels and
targets to be achieved over the life of the SO. Normally, A PMP should:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Include a calendar of performance management tasks;
Provide baseline values;
Specify the source of the data and the method for data collection;
Specify the schedule for data collection;
Describe known data limitations of each performance indicator; and
Describe the quality assessment procedures.
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These basic USAID methods and procedures for M&E can be applied to programs operating in conflictaffected environments in order to assess their impacts in reducing conflict and building peace. But using
these methods and procedures for measuring performance in conflict-affected settings requires special
attention to the particular measurement criteria that are meaningful in those conflict contexts and to the
practical challenges for gathering and interpreting performance information. The following sections
address these two challenges.

B. WHAT PERFORMANCE CRITERIA SHOULD BE ASSESSED?
The first consideration is what criteria are appropriate for monitoring and evaluating program
performance in conflict contexts. As discussed earlier, the basic aim of conflict-sensitive programming is
to shape USAID’s existing programs or new ones, wherever appropriate, so they reduce the causes of
conflict and strengthen the capacities for peace. Some of the goals USAID sets, such as democracy and
economic growth, derive from its general policy objectives and may or may not contribute in specific
contexts to the goals of reducing conflict and building peace. In some conflict contexts, achieving these
established development goals may be compatible with the goals of reducing conflict and building peace;
however, in many other situations, the former goals may be incompatible with the latter. Programs may
have no effects on conflict and peace, or worse, their achievement may actually generate conflict or
weaken capacities for peace.
For example, economic reforms used in developing countries to stimulate economic growth have been
criticized for impairing peace processes in post-conflict societies. It has been argued that structural
adjustment programs should be applied only if and when they demonstrably contribute to post-conflict
peace processes [“peace conditionality”], but not simply on their own terms. Another example is holding
majoritarian elections in ethnically-divided societies, which can increase inter-group tensions even further
Consequently, it cannot be automatically assumed that overall policy goals and associated programs can
be achieved in conflict environments as easily or quickly as in more stable contexts. In fact, a “one size
fits all” approach can lead to failed programs or even worsen the situation.. Certain overarching policy
goals may need to be postponed or adjusted to take into account what is possible, helpful, and sustainable
in post-conflict environments in particular. Furthermore, because of the political and economic stakes
involved in conflicts, operational decisions related to local staff, local partners, local contractors,
geographical locations, and the timing of activities may have as significant an impact on the success of
monitoring and evaluation activities as they do on the success of program implementation.
To measure program performance in conflict situations, M&E criteria and indicators should measure
whether program efforts are serving conflict and peace goals, at the times when it is most appropriate to
do so. This means looking at programs through a different lens -- a conflict and peace lens -- than if M&E
were only focused on particular established project, program or sectoral objectives. Conflict-sensitive
M&E impact criteria, and corresponding IRs if not SOs, are needed.
Because conflict management is a relatively new goal for USAID and other development organizations,
specific M&E criteria that are appropriate to use for measuring achievement of conflict and peace goals
have not been developed extensively. However, European donors and the UN have developed many
helpful tools that are being adapted for USAID’s purposes. The formulation of M&E techniques for the
specific purpose of assessing development programs’ impacts on conflict and peace has been pursued
under the rubric of “peace and conflict impact assessment” (PCIA).
As described in Part II, a PCIA is a method for determining the effects of an intervention on peace and
conflict, and the effects of peace and conflict on the intervention. PCIAs marry the relatively new goals of
conflict and peacebuilding with the long-established methods of program evaluation in order to apply
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conflict and peace impact criteria to development, humanitarian assistance, and transition, as well as
programs that are explicitly conflict resolution or peacebuilding. PCIA is simply another name for M&E
that takes an interest in measuring impacts on conflict and peace in particular - as opposed to established
development goals such as reducing poverty or democratization. Part II described the role that a PCIA can
play in program design.
ARE PROGRAMS MAKING A DIFFERENCE?
A frequently asked question in relation to evaluating programs aimed at conflict reduction and
peacebuilding is: Have programs - whether they are aimed at prevention during the pre-conflict phase, at
management during the crisis phase, or at reconciliation during the post-conflict phase – had the desired
impacts in conflict prevention, the cessation of violence, or improved societal relationships?
Part of the answer can be found by referring to the initial CVA discussed in Part I. The CVA includes an
analysis of the causes of conflict and the causes of peace. If the program has succeeded in decreasing or
eliminating one or more causes of conflict or in building or strengthening one or more causes of peace,
there is a good chance that the program has made a contribution towards conflict prevention, conflict
management, or reconciliation. Consequently, the specific indicators that should be used to measure the
conflict and peace performance of programs and projects should be formulated by referring back to the
particular causes of conflict and the causes of peace that emerged in the CVA. These indicators will
measure whether particular interventions are having desired impacts on the causes of conflict and/or the
“causes of peace” (peace capacities).
Accordingly, illustrative examples of conflict-sensitive impact criteria include:
•
•

•

•

Behavior – is conflict behavior reduced or prevented (e.g. violent incidents, contributing funds to
armed groups, joining armed groups)?
Attitudes and perceptions – have inter-group attitudes and perceptions that can increase the risk of
conflict improved? Are the projects encouraging more positive perceptions and attitudes and
reducing inter-ethnic distrust or prejudice between the ordinary members of contending ethnic
groups, such as by creating or strengthening direct contacts and working relationships?
Political and governing processes and policies – were organizational and procedural capacities to
manage conflicts strengthened? Do the projects help to create or strengthen legitimate, integrative
institutions and procedures (old or new, formal or informal) that can manage public affairs for all
citizens and can channel future emerging disputes and conflict issues into peaceful processes for
resolution? Has the enforcement of norms such as civil and political human rights been bolstered?
Underlying conditions – were basic socio-economic conditions that can predispose areas to
potential conflicts reduced?

C. HOW CAN M&E BE CONDUCTED IN CONFLICT SETTINGS?
CHALLENGES OF CONDUCTING M&E IN CONFLICT CONTEXTS7
Several factors having to do with the nature of conflict contexts make the designing and conducting of
monitoring and evaluation in conflict contexts different from doing M&E in other more stable
environments. These characteristics of conflict settings have a significant impact on USAID’s and other
partners’ programs, as well as the conducting of M&E in those contexts. Among the constraints that pose
methodological difficulties for monitoring and evaluation in conflict settings are the following:
7

This section draws in part on comments provided by the presenters in an USAID/OTI-sponsored workshop on
M&E in conflict contexts, March, 2004.
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1. One severe constraint is the lack of information or lack of access to information. In divided societies,
baseline data, such as census data, have political implications, and thus the processes of data
collection and data analysis can become politicized. Ethnic, religious, or gender differences may pose
monitoring challenges. In such contexts, the validity of government and other sources of data may be
questionable.
2. When states fail, the institutional infrastructure that supports data collection may be one of the first
systems to collapse. For example, Somalia has had no national level baseline data collected since the
overthrow of the government in 1990. The only such data that exists for Somalia are previous studies
carried out by multilateral organizations and donors. While Somalia may represent an extreme case,
similar situations exist in other countries for particular time periods or particular geographical areas.
3. Dangerous security environments are one of the greatest constraints to carrying out monitoring and
evaluation in a setting where violent conflict is still active, or just beneath the surface. Insecurity may
be a result of landmines, killing or kidnapping of assistance workers, the possibility of being caught
in crossfire between combatants, and other circumstances. This insecurity may severely limit access
to certain geographical areas, to certain groups of people, and often goes hand in hand with poor
transportation and communications infrastructure. It also greatly distorts the information that may be
provided by informants who are interviewed.
4. Because of the instabilities and insecurities in conflict situations, programs are unusually susceptible
to powerful and volatile external factors, such as changes in the security situation. This may require
programs to be flexible and to frequently change their operating procedures and even program/project
objectives.
5. Monitoring is relatively straightforward if there are consistent and measurable outputs and outcomes.
However, monitoring transition or post-conflict programs often involves measuring much more subtle
factors, such as changes in political activity and highly symbolic and emotional attitudes as well as
actions and behaviors that are often deliberately covert.
6. The pressures to act quickly may also limit the opportunity for doing monitoring and evaluation in
conflict settings. The constant threat of insecurity may limit the window of opportunity for doing
data collection to short-term actions. Similarly, the programming cycle timeframe for humanitarian
assistance as well as certain quick start-up transition programs is generally much shorter, so there
may be greater emphasis on the ‘action’ stage of the programming cycle, at the expense of the
‘reflection’ stage. This limits the opportunity to create a program feedback loop.
7. Although it is often possible to find a correlation between program activities and macro-level change,
it is generally difficult to demonstrate causation, again because of the fluidity of the situation and the
possible presence of many other actors in a sector or related sectors. This makes it more difficult to
attribute the results to a single program.
SOME GUIDELINES FOR M&E IN CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
1. In conflict settings, monitoring and evaluation must identify changes in the context and measure
impact of the program or project on the context – its impact on peace and conflict. Indicators must
therefore be developed for these factors.8 Standard program evaluations do consider whether
8

The toolkits being developed by USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) not only address
the relationship between conflict and peace to specific sectors (e.g., conflict and youth, natural resources, local
governance, human rights, valuable minerals, and forests.) They also include generic indicators to measure the
impacts of programs in these sectors on conflict and on peace.
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programs have some intended impact on their environments (outcomes), and also whether that
environment in which programs operate may have some influence on those observed outcomes
(contextual shaping factors). But in many of the conflict-prone contexts in which traditional
evaluations are carried out, evaluations tend to assume that the environment in which the programs
operate is relatively stable and regularized: a government and private sector are assumed to be in
operation. However, in post-conflict and other transitioning country contexts with political instability
and polarization, economic disarray, and inter-group animosities, such an environment cannot be
taken for granted. Instead, this environment is still in the process of being created. Moreover, the
programs that are to be evaluated are themselves being used to construct that overall stable
environment – governance, politics, social relations, and civil society (nation-building) -- not just to
produce particular immediate outcomes within a more or less fixed environment. The social,
political, and governance environment is simultaneously the context of the program and an intended
target of its activities. Given these broader peacebuilding aims, evaluations must look -- more broadly
for effects than is usually the case -- to the overall elements and dynamics of the context in which the
program operates, and for impacts of the program on those factors.
2. While being informed of general conflict-sensitive criteria, monitoring and evaluation in conflict
settings must also interpret outcomes and impacts in terms of a context-specific analysis. What is an
impact indicator of increased peace in one context may be an indicator of increased conflict in
another. For example, the presence of refugees and internally displaced persons and decisions
regarding the purchase and sale of livestock, cultivation of fields, food storage or sale, and cash
management, may indicate different conditions of peace or conflict. In one context an action such as
the sale of livestock, may be an indicator of increased conflict -- unlike cash or gold, livestock cannot
be moved across the terrain or across borders. However, in another time and place, the sale of
livestock may be an indicator of decreased conflict -- it means people are putting their assets into
cultivation, which is more permanent and less transportable than livestock. Thus, there is no substitute
for updated knowledge about the specific program or project location to know which indicator is valid
in a particular time and place.
3. Because of the complexity and volatility of conflict contexts, it is also important to develop
monitoring and evaluation designs that assess unplanned and unintended, as well as intended,
consequences of programs and projects. Scenario-based programming facilitates this because it
requires the development of different indicators for varying contingencies. Traditional evaluations
tend to assume that the environment in which the programs being evaluated operate is relatively
stable and unchanging. While USAID’s Results Framework does not measure the unintended impacts
of programs and projects, there are monitoring and evaluation models that might be adapted and
incorporated into the Results Framework for application in conflict settings.
4. Monitoring and evaluation in conflict settings must be multi-sectoral to be effective. The causes of
conflict and the capacities for peace can always be found in a variety of sectors. Ideally, programming
will be multi-sectoral, which, in turn, will require multi-sectoral monitoring and evaluation. Thus,
monitoring and evaluation in conflict contexts cannot be solely concerned with the impact of
programs and projects on a single aspect of the environment.
5. Monitoring and evaluation in conflict settings must be multi-leveled, as the causes of conflict and the
capacities for peace occur at various levels. These levels should be considered in three different areas.
First, distinctions should be made geographically, with consideration given to programs and impacts
on the national, regional, community, and even household levels. Secondly, it is important to include
various levels of society, from the elite to groups formed at the grassroots. Finally, causality should
also be analyzed on multiple levels, from the structural level to the level of triggers and accelerators.
Programming may target a specific level, but ultimately its impacts must be multi-leveled.
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M&E is usually only conducted at the micro levels of an activity, program, or sector, and measures
the particular aims of existing activities or projects -- as if success in those terms also means success
in macro-peacebuilding. But effective performance of these discrete efforts in their individual terms
may or may not add up to effectiveness in achieving the essential overall conflict and peace goals.
Even if they achieve particular program or project objectives well does not mean they are being
effective in overall conflict-sensitive terms. (“Each of our projects was evaluated to be successful,
and the country was going to hell!”) Thus, monitoring and evaluation in conflict settings must
measure the impact of the intervention at different levels. A hierarchy needs to be developed that is
composed of criteria showing how particular programs contribute in their individual ways toward the
broader conflict and peace goals that are listed above.
6. Such macro-level M&E also needs to adopt measures that correspond to overall goals that are
appropriate and realistic for different stages of conflict. For example, all post-conflict goals and
objectives are not likely to be achievable simultaneously and immediately. Some may be needed
before others are possible. Although there is no single recipe, there is a considerable body of casestudy and multi-case research that has focused in recent years on the basic effectiveness of
international policies/programs in post-conflict environments, and it suggests that certain goals may
need to be phased in at different post-conflict stages. The sequencing of these priorities generally
works best. Something like the following sequence is generally found to have the best chance of
promoting stable progress toward sustainable peace and beyond, and to avoid a return to violence:
•
•
•
•
•
•

“security first,” such as through effective police and law enforcement;
political agreements, such as power-sharing;
strong effective government agencies for delivering basic services;
legitimate government, so that it is not easily challenged, such as one reached through democratic
or representative processes;
economic growth to reduce poverty and begin to raise incomes; and
inter-group reconciliation.

7. Despite the difficulties of using the usual methods in conflict settings, M&E is still essential. To
bridge the gap, monitoring needs to be approached in a more flexible as well as frequent manner, with
more weight given to rapid and qualitative methods and efforts made to utilize any remote monitoring
systems that may be available.
8. By the same token, collaborative approaches are more likely to get a better measure of impact and
maximize resources. Ways to conduct collaborative monitoring and evaluations with other partners
can assess the impact not only of USAID’s programs and projects, but of the collective impact of
USAID’s interventions combined with those of other partners.
9. The M&E system should include specific ways to feed the results of monitoring and evaluation into
the programming cycle in the form of lessons learned and best practices that will inform subsequent
programming decisions.
DATA COLLECTION IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED ENVIRONMENTS
USAID/Mozambique made the following recommendations for performance monitoring during the period of
transition from war to peace, in which it confronted a lack of transportation and communication infrastructure,
lack of data, and insecurity.

• Select a small number of representative sites that can be visited safely
• Mobilize existing staff to form a small multi-sectoral team, with a mix of local and international staff, that
schedules regular visits to each site

• Develop a simple multiple-sectoral ‘site visit guide’ or reporting format
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• Take lots of ‘before and after’ photographs
• Insist on prompt trip reports and circulate them widely
• Organize periodic all-Mission meetings to discuss trends and implications to trip findings
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I ~ ACRONYMS
ADS
AFR/SD
AG
BPBS
CA
CBJ
CDU
CEWARN
CMM
CPDG
CPMR
CSO
CSP
CTO
CVA
DAA
DCHA
DDR
DFID
DG
DP
DRL
ECK
EGAT
GAD
GDO
GHA
IDP
IGAB
IGC
INL
INR
IR
M&E
MAC
MCA
NGO
OFDA
OTI
PDO
PICA
PMP
PMP

Automated Directives System
Africa Bureau’s Office of Sustainable Development
Attorney General
Bureau Program and Budget Submission
Conflict Assessment
Congressional Budget Justification
Central Depository Unit
Conflict Early Warning and Response Network
Conflict Management and Mitigation
Conflict Prevention, Democracy and Governance
Conflict Prevention, Mitigation, and Response
Civil Society Organization
Country Strategic Plan
Cognizant Technical Officer
Conflict Vulnerability Assessment
Designated Approving Authority
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
United Kingdom Department for International Development
Democracy and Governance
Development Planning (Office)
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (technical bureau)
Electoral Commission of Kenya
Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade
Gender and Development
General Development Office
Greater Horn of Africa
Internally Displaced Person(s)
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Indefinite Quantity Contract
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Dept. of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Immediate Results
Monitoring and Evaluation
Managing African Conflict
Millennium Challenge Account
Nongovernmental Organization
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
Office of Transition Initiatives
Planning and Development Office
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
Performance Management/Monitoring Plan
Performance Monitoring Plan
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POSE
PRM
PVO
RCSA
REDSO
RFA
RFP
RSA
SO
SOW
TPM
UNDP
USG

Point of Service Evaluation
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Department of State
Private Voluntary Organization
Regional Center for Southern Africa
Regional Economic Development Support Office/USAID
Request for Applications
Request for Proposals
Republic of South Africa
Strategic/Special Objectives
Scope of Work
Team Planning Meeting
United Nations Development Program
United States Government
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APPENDIX II ~ CONFLICT CAUSES,
STAGES, AND SCALES
The Causes of Conflicts

Major conflicts in a society do not occur spontaneously, even at the local level. Although the
precise timing of outbreaks of intra-state conflicts is usually unpredictable, they are not random
events that suddenly befall societies with no causal antecedents. Analysts of conflict have
produced a huge literature that seeks to identify through systematic research the principal causes
of intra-state conflicts. This research has gone on since at least the early 1990s and continues to
be refined. The two principal research methods used in this literature have been large “n”
(number) statistical studies and single or multiple case studies. The first approach looks for
statistical correlations between conflict indicators (e.g., numbers of people killed) on the one
hand, and various possible explanatory factors that are associated with those outcomes on the
other hand (e.g., population density). The second approach looks in-depth at one or a small
number of cases of particular countries that have been in conflict in order to identify the causes
evident in those cases. Both are empirical methods insofar as they systematically search for
evidence to test explicit hypotheses about cause-effect relationships, and each approach has its
advantages.
The two methods tend to lead to somewhat different emphases in their conclusions, respectively,
between the more “slow-moving” fundamental and long-term factors – which tend to be
historical, economic and environmental in nature – versus the more “fast-moving” immediate
and short-term dynamic factors – which tend to be more political, institutional and behavioral in
nature. Because these differing emphases will have rather different policy implications, both
kinds of factors need to be examined for their significance in any given CVA focus. Also,
because the types of conflicts that this research has looked at have been variously defined or
labeled as civil wars, civil conflicts, ethnic conflicts, failed states, complex humanitarian
emergencies, secessionist struggles, and genocides, these different “dependent variables”
sometimes lead to somewhat different explanatory factors or emphases. Nevertheless, when all
these studies are surveyed and compiled, what becomes evident is that there is considerable
consensus on the range of factors that tend to produce intra-state conflicts of various kinds.
Because conflicts tend to arise from several kinds of interacting long-term and short-term factors,
each with differing action implications, analysts typically list the various causal factors under
four main headings:
Background factors are broad pervasive historical or global trends and natural facts that may make
societies more susceptible or vulnerable to conflict although they do not cause it. Examples would be past
inter-group violence or repression combined with a highly mountainous terrain and porous borders and
other geographic and resource features that make it easy to import arms without government hindrance.
Due to a number of historical and political factors, certain causes and characteristics of conflicts in Africa
are continent-wide and thus constitute important background factors. Such factors include: ethnic groups
living on both sides of national borders, differing ethnicities within borders, and colonial and Cold War
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policies that set ethnic group against ethnic group and country against country. It is critical to undertake
CVAs in Africa bearing in mind these broader geographical, social, cultural, and historical contexts.
These factors also include major historical periods when global systemic forces are threatening to change
a society’s existing social order, hurting some groups and benefiting others and thus creating clashing
interests. Such global influences have included, for example, the breakdown of communist governments
in many nations beginning in the late 1980s, and in Africa, after the Cold War, the withdrawal by the
superpowers of financial and military assistance to their ally governments.
Structural conditions, or so-called “root causes,” are basic and pervasive underlying social and
economic conditions within societies that affect large numbers of people and tend to persist over long
periods. These are more controllable than the background factors, although difficult to change. They
provide fertile ground for other causal factors and thus increase the risk of conflicts in developing
societies, but they, too, are not sufficient in themselves to lead to violence. Examples would be:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

High population density;
Dramatic shifts in ethnic group proportions;
Ecological deterioration;
Low level of economic development and high poverty;
High levels of unemployment, especially among men;
Rapid economic decline;
Social structures divided into a small number of groups with several differing characteristics;
Chronic inter-group material inequalities, including those arising from public policies; and
External kinship affinities with groups in neighboring countries.

Accelerators are resources, organizations, institutions, and processes that work upon the structural factors
in order to increase their practical significance. A complex process is required to interpret, channel, and
link a society’s structural conditions with group interests and to mobilize the population to take collective
action such as violence (or peace). These intermediary processes and institutions will affect whether
groups can be politicized and mobilized to take action and whether that action is peaceful or violent. Key
factors include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Political organizations such as parties based on group identities;
Resources to organize and supply political or armed movements, especially funding and weapons;
Governing institutions and policies that encourage corruption and rent-seeking, thus sapping the
ability of the government to serve the public and inviting forceful challenges;
Divisive leaders who seek to exploit diverging ethnic and religious loyalties;
Political elite conflicts and competition within factions that encourage extremism;
Weak, ineffective security forces that cannot deter violence;
Absent or weak international engagement to provide incentives for moderation; and
Regional threats to security and lack of communication and relationships among the governments
in a region.

Triggers are relatively sudden acts or events that act as catalysts in igniting a crisis or conflict and can
provoke violence, such as the assassination of a leader, discovery of widespread election fraud, or a
political scandal. For example:
•
•
•
•

Political leaders’ unilateral, provocative public behavior, such as bellicose rhetoric;
Repressive security forces that respond harshly to peaceful protest and thus provoke more
violence;
Highly symbolic acts that destroy esteemed cultural or religious property or disrupt such events;
Specific acts of violence such as assassinations of leaders; and
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•

Sudden price or subsidy changes sparking demonstrations that weaken government legitimacy or
provoke state repression.

None of these risk factors will necessarily cause violence individually or even together with others.
Several factors are needed, but the probabilities of violence increase the more these factors are present,
are significant, and coalesce in particular places and times.
THE LEVELS OF HOSTILITY
The more that accelerators and triggers are present, the greater is the level of open hostilities that are
expressed by a conflict. Thus, conflicts evolve through their own life cycles or histories, marked mainly
by the level of these hostilities. The following typology describes a continuum of conflict stages, some of
which are peaceful and some which produce violence.9
LATENT CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT
•

Stable peace: Mutually beneficial exchanges occur among a variety of more or less equal groups
and institutions. Legal, political, and policy disputes follow accepted rules and procedures.
Disputes may become major controversies that receive wide public attention, cause contentious
debate, and raise the political temperature, but they operate through existing institutional
processes. Non-violent public demonstrations are an example, for they are not physically
coercive and ordinarily represent legitimate political activity, even though they may exhibit some
excesses.

LATENT DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT
•

•

Structural conflict: The basis for social conflicts is largely unacknowledged, and the outbreak of
overt violence may be remote, if it ever does occur. But basic interests of communities and
groups are in conflict with each other due to chronically inappropriate policies and practices that
lead to economic deterioration, reinforce divisions among groups, suppress or exploit certain
groups (“structural violence”), and deprive society of collective methods for solving problems.
Thus, in the absence of agreed procedures, the most powerful interests take harmful unilateral
action against others.
Unstable peace: Signs of growing alienation, emerging tensions, social divisions, and active
disengagement become more open. But government actions may deny specific groups the ability
to carry on political action by closing their offices, media censorship, bans, outlawing gatherings
and demonstrations, and arbitrary arrests, harassment, or deportations. Intense disputes suggest
that existing institutions and processes for handling conflict are under strain or threatened.

MANIFEST DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT
•

•

Crisis: A higher level of overt tensions, group polarization, confrontation, overt suppression, and
possibly some low-level physical violence. Political confrontations may occur in the form of
walkouts, boycotts, sit-ins, mass violent demonstration,s and other irregular political activity that
reflects the absence or deterioration of regular political and policymaking processes. These
situations often elicit special, ad hoc, extra-institutional channels for negotiations.
Limited violent conflict: Sporadic violent clashes possibly causing some deaths, such as electoral
violence and ethnic riots, political violence through assassinations, kidnappings, disappearances,
bombings, isolated attacks on government installations, and ethnic cleansing.

9

Differing stages of conflict, such as emergence, escalation, de-escalation, (re)construction, and reconciliation, have
been adopted as an organizing framework by recent conflict textbooks (Kriesberg 2003; Miall et al. 1999).
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•

Armed, or militarized, conflict: Active and continuous use of deadly force by organized guerrilla
groups and/or armies, such as in civil wars.

Conflicts may shift from latent to open conflict and from constructive to destructive and back again.
Latent conflicts may escalate to open conflicts of various intensities, these levels may eventually deescalate, reach a settlement and be followed by a re-stabilization phase. We can thus find intra-state
conflicts at all these various stages, based on the degree of visible coercion or physical force through
which conflict is pursued.
Many features of conflicts change as they move through these stages. The more hostile and lasting the
conflict becomes, new stakes are created in the conduct of the conflict itself. The issues in dispute change
and ramify, protagonists adopt differing loyalties and identities based on changing interests, and
additional parties may enter the fray. Thus, the policy utility of distinguishing such stages is that they
generally call for very different kinds of interventions. Some levels of conflict are more amenable to
outside influence than others. Generally, the greater the level of open physical hostility between major
organized interests, and the more sustained its use, the more difficult it is to reduce a conflict or keep it
from continuing, other things being equal.
Laying out the antecedent stages of violent conflicts also points to moments for international action when
positive measures of preventive peacebuilding can be more feasibly and effectively undertaken. These
measures might include democratization promotion, measures to reduce corruption and professionalize
state agencies, market reforms, and other programs, where they will not destabilize societies but foster
peaceful change.
CONFLICT SCALES
Another key dimension for responding to intra-state conflicts is their scale or scope. Destructive and
violent intra-state conflicts may vary from small and localized to convulsive, nation-wide civil wars. To
get a better sense of the variety of policy options to address conflicts and their comparative utility, it is
essential to appreciate these different sizes or scales. Scale refers to the geographic and political levels of
a conflict and thus the kinds and sizes of the parties that tend to be involved. Conflicts can occur between
two or more sovereign states (regional and inter-state), within states (intra-state), and between or within
local communities (local), including those within a country or across borders:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Global: among several states in several regional theatres;
Regional: among several states in the same region;
Inter-state: between two states;
Intra-state;
National: among two or more groups or forces over the definition and form of the same state;
Localized: solely among or within groups in the same local geographic area;10

More specifically, national intra-state conflicts recently have included: insurgencies to disrupt or oppose
central regimes (e.g., Philippines, Macedonia); inter-group violent conflict over access to jobs, education,
subsidies, etc. (e.g., Sri Lanka); violent struggles between political elites, factions, or political movements
for control of, or over policies of, the state (e.g., Burundi, Rwanda, Cambodia); sectarian movements
seeking disruption or overthrow of secular regimes (e.g., Algeria, Indonesia); separatist or autonomy or
irredentist conflicts to gain political control over subnational jurisdictions (e.g., Ethiopia-Eritrea, Serbia,

10

Both national and localized conflicts might occur only within state boundaries or spread across state boundaries.
National conflicts can take localized forms of the larger conflicts.
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Georgia). Localized intra-state conflicts usually involve inter-communal conflicts over access to land,
water, pasture, and other scarce natural resources (e.g., Northern Kenya).
These conflict scopes are also a crucial consideration for policymakers because they tend to involve
differing population sizes, channels for articulating interests and organizing collective action,
geographical spaces, and degrees of destruction, and thus, their tractability for those trying to reduce
them. Generally, the higher the level of open destructive intra-state conflicts, the more people required to
wage them, the more people killed and displaced, and the more destructive their impact. Two pastoral
tribes engaging in cattle-rustling with spears entail a more manageable problem (unless many such
localized conflicts are occurring throughout a country), than would government and rebel armies
deploying mortars, tanks, and airplanes against each other. The latter will usually be much more difficult
11
to alleviate and terminate.
As obvious as the importance of the levels and scales of hostilities may seem, the discussion and
implementation of interventions in intra-state conflicts often ignore these crucial considerations of
whether the interventions’ scale of activity and potential scope of influence correspond in any
proportional way to the scale of the conflict at which they are directed. Table II.2 combines all the
conflict dimensions discussed above in order to show the many forms and faces of intra-state conflicts
that international and domestic actors may choose to address, and gives examples.
Table II.2: Differing Degrees of Conflict on Two Dimensions: Stage of Hostilities and Scale
Stages of Hostilities (Extent of use of physical force)
Constructive
Conflict
Scales at which
conflict occurs
(Global)
Regional
Inter-state

National

Local
Transborder
Inter-communal
Intra-communal
Within country
Inter-communal
Intra-communal

Stable peace

Latent
Structural
conflict

Competition for world
markets
Legal disputes over
cross-border
environmental hazards
Adjudication by Hague
World Court

Destructive Conflict
Manifest
Unstable peace

Crisis

Unilateral attempts of states
to control territory and
borders, water, or energy
resources.
Country monopolies on vital
non-renewable natural
resources
Non-violent
Coercive maneuvering
demonstrations over
between competing elites
unpaid wages,
over control of state assets.
Presidential and
Jailings of members of
parliamentary elections legitimate political parties

Neighboring country

Competition for
tourism, central
government aid
Disputes over location
of waste dumps

Abiding distrust
Inter-ethnic
between ethnic groups
demonstrations in
in two adjacent
several localities
countries
Local authorities always

Competition by two or more
villages on two sides of
borders over a common river
Rivalry/discrimination
among ethnic or religious
groups for land and jobs

Violent
conflict

Border
confrontations and
rhetorically champions
occasional
the cause of a “kin
incursions against
group” that is a minority perceived security
threats
in a targeted country

Country provides
harbor and arms
to an insurgency
against its
neighbor;
Inter-state wars

Agitation by sub-

Occasionally violent

national territories for

street demonstrations

autonomy or secession

and police

Civil war
between
government and
”rebels”

crackdowns
Violent interethnic clashes

favor one political
faction over others
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However, because civil wars have been increasingly targeted on civilians, they may cause more deaths than interstate wars, and they may require more time and resources for post-conflict reconstruction.
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